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The Street View of Property 
VANESSA CASADO PÉREZ† 
Parking on public streets is scarce. The current allocation system for parking spots based on the 
rule of capture coupled with low parking fees creates a tragedy of the commons scenario. The 
misallocation of parking has consequences for commerce, for access to public spaces, and for 
pollution and congestion. Municipalities have not widely adopted the solution that economists 
propose to solve this scarcity problem: increase the price. Politics aside, the reluctance of 
municipalities to do so may be explained by the unique nature of public property as reflected in 
well-rooted legal and societal constraints. This unique nature helps explain, for example, 
municipalities’ ban on software applications (apps) allowing occupants of curbside parking to 
“sell” their spots to would-be occupants in Boston or San Francisco. While the ban may be 
justified, the unique nature of public property is not incompatible with some well-designed, 
efficiency-oriented policies, as this Article will put forward.  
This Article distills the legal constraints on curbside parking and any other public property 
management by drawing on case law regarding parking meters and public resources managed 
in trust for the public, and decisions by municipalities regarding parking apps and privatization 
of parking meters. These constraints include, among others, that public property shall not be 
used to raise revenue, although placing a price on it may pursue other regulatory aims consistent 
with public use, or that municipalities shall not lose control of the public spaces dedicated to 
curbside parking. At a normative level, the above constraints provide a framework for assessing 
policies regarding curbside parking and, by extension the management of any other public 
property resources. At a positive level, the Article proposes ways to make efficiency compatible 
with the principles guiding the management of public property. It analyzes whether, and to what 
extent, the efficiency-oriented policies that would translate into a price increase—variable 
pricing, tradable property rights, and privatization—clash with those principles constraining 
the monetization of public property. In addition, the Article concludes by pointing to other 
situations where its analytical framework could be extended, such as other uses of public streets 
(for instance, use of public bus stops by shuttle-buses of private companies) or existing practices 
in connection to public resources (for instance, semi-privatization of beaches).   
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INTRODUCTION 
Parking on the street is an everyday struggle for many Americans. During 
business hours, quests for elusive and much coveted spots take place in 
downtowns and other commercial areas. After the evening commute, this battle 
moves to densely populated residential neighborhoods. Sometimes a vacant spot 
is found right away, but often precious time is lost. According to some estimates, 
city dwellers spend as many as four years of their lives looking for parking.1 In 
a vicious circle, the resulting extra driving increases congestion and pollution, 
two of the greatest maladies of urban living. Parking woes are a familiar 
illustration of scarcity: a mismatch between overwhelming demand and 
insufficient supply. 
For governments, managing parking is no small challenge.2 A parking 
space is itself public property, and is instrumental in promoting the use of other 
public property, such as parks. Indeed, by providing residents access to public 
spaces, parking facilitates a city’s democratic community.3 Parking is also 
instrumental to everyday activities, like getting a license from the city council, 
picking up a prescription at the drugstore, or going to work.4 And, of course, 
parking policy has an impact on traffic congestion. Extra driving to find parking 
generates congestion and, thus, costs time and causes unnecessary pollution. 
Municipalities face a delicate juggling act in balancing demands on parking from 
advocates for commerce, politics, the environment, and basic fairness.5 These 
competing demands reflect in turn the unique nature of public streets. Far from 
simply being property owned by a public entity, streets are public property in a 
different and much more fundamental sense. Streets are held by municipalities 
on behalf of the public for the pursuit of public good; a characterization that is 
not inconsequential.6 
 
 1. Wim Elfrink, The Smart-City Solution, MCKINSEY & CO. 2 (Oct. 2012), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-sector/our-insights/the-smart-city-solution. More moderate 
estimates show that a city dweller in the U.K. spends 106 days of her life looking for parking. Motorists Spend 
106 Days Looking for Parking Spots, TELEGRAPH (May 27, 2013, 9:25 AM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/news/10082461/Motorists-spend-106-days-looking-for-parking-
spots.html. 
 2. See Aparkalypse Now: The Perilous Politics of Parking, ECONOMIST (Apr. 6, 2017), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21720281-average-car-moves-just-5-time-improve-cities-focus-
other-95-perilous.  
 3. SARAH MARUSEK, POLITICS OF PARKING: RIGHTS, IDENTITY, AND PROPERTY 6 (2012). 
 4. See, e.g., Jeremy Dalmas, San Francisco Program Aims to Make Fines More Fair for the Poor, NPR 
(Apr. 13, 2017, 4:33 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/13/523269628/san-francisco-program-aims-to-make-
smaller-fines-more-fair-for-poor. This is the story of Echo, a low-income worker who needed her truck to get to 
different jobs, but whose truck was impounded after she accumulated parking fines for expired meters. Id. 
 5. See, e.g., Gregory Pierce & Donald Shoup, SFPark: Pricing Parking by Demand, ACCESS, Fall 2013, 
at 20, 23. Pierce and Shoup describe the variable pricing for parking program in San Francisco, which aims to 
reduce congestion by ensuring that there are vacant spots at all times. Id. at 25. This aim, they point out, conflicts 
with the parking policy goal of increasing turnover to ensure commerce. Id. at 27. 
 6. The nature of public property is complex. Carol Rose calls it a “conundrum.” Carol Rose, The Comedy 
of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 711 (1986). 
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Pricing out demand by least-valuing users, a standard economic response 
to scarcity, has not been widely adopted by municipalities, the public entities 
entrusted with the daunting task of regulating parking.7 Sharing-economy 
initiatives have failed to gain the trust of municipalities as illustrated by the 
Boston and San Francisco bans of software applications (“apps”) allowing 
occupants of curbside parking to “sell” their spots (or, more precisely, their 
rights to use the spot) to would-be occupants.8 Attempts to improve management 
by means of privatization have also fallen short of initial expectations as 
illustrated by the privatization of parking meter management in Chicago.9 Public 
choice explanations aside, municipalities may be shunning these management 
tools—pricing, trade in parking spots, and privatization—to mitigate parking 
scarcity because of legal constraints. 
As Part III describes, five recurring legal principles constrain the 
management of curbside parking:10 (1) the price of curbside parking shall never 
exceed the cost of providing it; (2) pricing shall not be used to raise revenue, 
although it may pursue a regulatory aim consistent with other principles; (3) any 
revenue obtained shall be earmarked for use in connection with curbside parking 
or related needs; (4) municipalities shall not lose control of the public spaces 
dedicated to curbside parking; and (5) alienation of curbside parking by the 
municipality is not admissible unless partial and accompanied by either 
provision of substitutes or proof of enhancement of the goals being served. 
These legal constraints also reflect social attitudes. The public shows mistrust of 
monetization of public property by either the municipality or private actors. 
These legal constraints offer a framework to guide and evaluate the management 
of any public property.  
When considering the above legal constraints, municipalities often prefer 
to err on the side of access and fairness rather than on the side of efficiency. As 
long as everyone is able to afford parking on Main Street in a public space 
 
 7. Donald C. Shoup, Buying Time at the Curb, in THE HALF-LIFE OF POLICY RATIONALES: HOW NEW 
TECHNOLOGY AFFECTS OLD POLICY ISSUES 60, 65 (Fred E. Foldvary & Daniel B. Klein eds., 2003).  
 8. David Streitfeld, Parking Apps Face Obstacles at Every Turn, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2015, 6:29 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/parking-apps-face-obstacles-at-every-turn/. 
 9. Max Fisher, Why Does Abu Dhabi Own All of Chicago’s Parking Meters?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 19, 2010), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/10/why-does-abu-dhabi-own-all-of-chicago-s-parking-
meters/339805/; Fran Spielman, Parking Meter Deal Keeps Getting Worse for City as Meter Revenues Rise, 
CHI. SUN TIMES (May 14, 2018, 7:53 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/parking-meter-deal-keeps-
getting-worse-for-city-as-meter-revenues-rise/; see also infra Subpart III.A. 
 10. Regarding parking, see City of Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 172 So. 114 (Ala. 1937); 
In re Op. of the Justices, 8 N.E.2d 179 (Mass. 1937); Ex parte Duncan, 65 P.2d 1015 (Okla. 1937); and William 
Laubach & Sons v. City of Easton, 32 A.2d 881 (Pa. 1943). In relation to the public trust doctrine, see Ill. Cent. 
R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 
445 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); and Kootenai Envtl. 
All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983). Other decisions analyzed are In re Avella 
v. City of New York, 80 N.E.3d 982 (N.Y. 2017); Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 
N.E.2d 1050 (N.Y. 2001); and Union Square Park Coal., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, No. 
102734-12, 2013 WL 308912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 25, 2013), order rev’d, 966 N.Y.S.2d 669 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2013). 
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ultimately managed by a public entity, wasted time as well as other indicia of 
inefficiency are lesser evils. This Article argues that the management of public 
property requires attention to goals and limitations that standard economic-
efficiency accounts do not capture. However, a solution to curbside parking 
scarcity is also needed. To identify that solution, the Article analyzes whether 
these constraints are intrinsically incompatible with certain responses to scarcity 
of curbside parking based on efficiency, namely variable pricing, tradable 
property rights, and privatization.  
Each of these economics-oriented responses would result in a price 
increase of curbside parking (currently free or subject to payment of a small per 
hour fee).11 Consequently, fewer drivers will be willing to park and the less 
affluent may find themselves priced out of curbside parking. Variable pricing 
programs, such as the ones already implemented in certain areas of San 
Francisco and Boston, hinge on parking fees fluctuating upwards when demand 
peaks. Prices of tradable property rights, such as rights to use a parking spot 
offered for sale via apps, were generally higher than parking fees.12 In addition, 
parking fees still need to be paid on top of the app price if the right to use refers 
to a metered spot. Last, if privatization brings onboard a for-profit corporation, 
profit maximization and the initial pressure to break even are certain to lead to 
an increase in parking fees, as illustrated by the outsourced management of 
parking meters in Chicago in 2008. 
The better and cheaper public transportation is, the lesser impact increases 
in parking fees have in terms of access and fairness. With few exceptions, public 
transportation networks in most American cities do not meet the bar. Jobs and 
homes are further and further away from each other13 and not necessarily 
connected with public transportation. But these concerns for access and fairness 
should not make us dismiss the economic tools to deal with scarcity. Both can 
be compatible. If parking revenue increases translate into better funding for 
public transportation, the impact on fairness could be largely offset.  
But not all economic recipes to deal with parking scarcity can be 
compatible with the constraints that managing curbside parking is subject to 
because of its nature as public property. The best public transportation would 
not be enough to make privatization or peer-to-peer trading of parking spots 
 
 11. In Boston, for instance, the fare for curbside parking did not increase for twenty years prior to 2011. 
Bob Shaffer, Boston to Test Higher Parking Meter Prices as Part of Pilot Program, WBUR NEWS (Dec. 1, 
2016), http://www.wbur.org/news/2016/12/01/boston-dynamic-pricing-parking-meter-pilot-program. 
 12. Brian Ng, These Apps Are Trying to Reinvent Parking, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 5, 2014, 2:07 PM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/apps-are-trying-to-reinvent-parking-2014-9. 
 13. ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & NATALIE HOLMES, BROOKINGS, THE GROWING DISTANCE BETWEEN PEOPLE 
AND JOBS IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 10 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Srvy_JobsProximity.pdf. Living farther away from the workplace is a trend that only 
seems to increase in cities like San Francisco, Philadelphia, or Bakersfield. See Elizabeth Kneebone & Natalie 
Holmes, The Growing Distance Between People and Jobs in Metropolitan America, BROOKINGS (Mar. 24, 
2015), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-growing-distance-between-people-and-jobs-in-metropolitan-
america/ (scroll to the interactive map and use the “Search for a metropolitan area to map” feature to locate 
information for cities such as San Francisco, Philadelphia, and Bakersfield).  
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compatible with legal and societal constraints. First, privatization of parking 
meters in Chicago amounts to a handover of curbside control to private entities. 
Second, prices for the exchanges using parking apps are not linked to, let alone 
capped by, the cost of providing parking. The app prices were based on the 
individuals’ opportunity costs, not on the societal costs.  
Conversely, variable pricing may be compatible with legal and societal 
constraints if an adequate public transportation network is in place and the 
following requisites are met: (1) fees are calculated so as to target the occupancy 
rate that is expected to achieve goals beneficial for the public, such as reducing 
congestion, reducing pollution, and increasing the turnover frequency; (2) fees 
are based on the social costs of parking—among others, meters, enforcement, or 
congestion; (3) part of the revenue is channeled into improving public 
transportation to and from the areas where variable pricing is implemented. San 
Francisco offers a good example of proper variable pricing framework.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Subpart I.A analyzes the central role of 
parking in urban America. Subpart I.B examines current allocation of curbside 
parking based on a first-in-time rule coupled with low fees and time-limits. 
Subpart I.C describes the costs and externalities resulting from such an 
allocation system. Part II surveys case law on parking meters as well as on other 
publicly-owned resources and identifies the principles guiding the management 
of public property. Part III analyzes whether the solutions an economist would 
propose to solve parking scarcity and the ensuing congestion could be made 
compatible with the principles distilled in Part II. Part III does so by closely 
examining the privatization of parking meter management in Chicago, the bans 
of curbside parking apps in San Francisco and Boston, and the variable pricing 
in place also in San Francisco and Boston. The Article concludes by suggesting 
new avenues for research on the legal principles constraining the management 
and monetization of public property in other contentious cases, such as the use 
of San Francisco’s public bus stops by Silicon Valley companies’ buses and the 
semi-privatization of beaches by surfers.  
I.  PARKING: A CITY’S NIGHTMARE 
A.  A DIFFICULT BALANCE TO STRIKE: FAIRNESS VS. ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
When managing curbside parking, a municipality needs to balance several, 
often conflicting goals.14 Curbside parking is instrumental for commerce, getting 
to work, getting services, and even for democratic participation.  
Municipalities may resolve to implement a free but time-limited curbside 
parking area to please businesses by enhancing commerce by increasing the 
 
 14. Even private developers dealing with parking have to balance different goals when deciding whether 
to charge for parking and how to account for the positive effects that parking may have for the commercial 
retailers in an area. Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11, 14–
15 (1964). 
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number of people visiting the downtown area. Enhancing commerce has a clear 
economic dimension, but commerce is also part of our socialization 
experience.15 But beyond enhancing commerce, the municipality must take into 
account that curbside parking is instrumental to participation in the life of a 
municipality.16 Parking has been described as a “site of law in the everyday in 
which democracy flourishes.”17  
The relevance of curbside parking comes from its significance for mobility, 
which in turn is central to personal fulfillment in modern society.18 With few 
notable exceptions (for example, New York City and, albeit to a lesser extent, 
San Francisco), living in many American cities and towns without a car seriously 
limits the possibilities for personal enrichment and social interaction. In most 
cities, you need a car and a place to park it. Even in those cities with public 
transportation networks, gentrification may push those who work low-paying 
jobs further away from their places of employment, making cars even more 
central.  
Further elaborating on the importance of cars, only 8% of households in 
the nation do not have a vehicle.19 Not surprisingly, this figure is not uniformly 
spread across the population. Households with “an annual income of less than 
$25,000 are almost nine times as likely to be a zero-vehicle household than those 
with incomes greater than $25,000.”20 The percentage of households without a 
car is higher in certain cities. In San Francisco, 31.24 % of the households do 
not own a car.21 Given these figures which illustrate that the poorest do not need 
a parking spot, cheap curbside parking has been criticized given the congestion 
and pollution it causes. First, other instrumental things for driving, such as gas, 
are not subsidized for the poor.22 Second, cheap publicly-provided parking 
implies that everyone, car owner or not, has to subsidize drivers because tax-
 
 15. See Rose, supra note 6, at 723 (“[C]ustomary doctrines suggest that commerce might be thought a 
‘comedy of the commons’ not only because it may infinitely expand our wealth, but also, at least in part, because 
it has been thought to enhance the sociability of the members of an otherwise atomized society.”). 
 16. For scholarship on public spaces such as parks or town squares enhancing participation in the local 
political life, see generally Sarah Schindler, The “Publicization” of Private Space, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1093 
(2018). 
 17. MARUSEK, supra note 3, at 5. 
 18. Setting aside Parking Day (a global event that began in 2005 during which metered parking lots are 
transformed into, for instance, locations for art exhibits or health clinics), while participation in the community 
life does not physically happen within the parking spot, it cannot happen without access to it. In fact, Marusek 
recognizes our dependence upon cars and the idea of parking as an extension of ourselves. Id. at 25. For an 
account of Parking Day, see Michael Kimmelman, Paved, but Still Alive, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/arts/design/taking-parking-lots-seriously-as-public-spaces.html. 
 19. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, NHTS: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE 2001 NATIONAL 
HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL SURVEY 6–9 (2001), 
https://www.bts.gov/sites/bts.dot.gov/files/legacy/publications/highlights_of_the_2001_national_household_tr
avel_survey/pdf/entire.pdf. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Vehicle Ownership in U.S. Cities Data and Map, GOVERNING STS. & LOCALITIES, 
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/car-ownership-numbers-of-vehicles-by-city-map.html (last visited Jan. 19, 
2019).  
 22. See DONALD C. SHOUP, THE HIGH COST OF FREE PARKING 530 (2017). 
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payers foot the bill. Hence, low income individuals, who are less likely to have 
a car, are paying the costs of medium and high-income drivers.23 Finally, more 
expensive fees for publicly-provided parking will generate revenue that could 
actually benefit low income individuals.24 
At first glance, the figures on car ownership can be read as mitigating the 
concerns about fairness in the allocation of parking.25 However, as many 
residential neighborhoods close to downtowns become gentrified, low and 
middle-income residents are pushed further away and cars become more 
important to them. While more than 30% of households in San Francisco do not 
own cars, the figure is far lower for the wider Bay Area, at 10% or less.26 Those 
living further away are forced to either quit their jobs or embark on strenuous 
commutes27 that sometimes end with an agonizing search for curbside parking 
(off-street parking being unaffordable on a daily basis). Stories abound of the 
growing distance between jobs and residences and time of commutes. Silicon 
Valley restaurateurs struggle to find waiters and waitresses because housing is 
too expensive in the area and their commutes—often with no public 
transportation available—are too long.28 In San Francisco, Echo Rowe, an 
employee in a low-paying job was forced to move her truck from one spot to 
another during breaks, only to accumulate $2,000 in parking fines anyway, in 
addition to the truck being towed.29 The towing company sold the truck because 
the owner could not pay to get it out of the impoundment lot, but she still owed 
the municipality $1,600, an amount she could not possibly pay without 
transportation, even while working three jobs (with no benefits).30  
If the only goal behind curbside parking polices were to increase vehicle 
turnover, therefore ensuring that businesses get as many clients as possible, a 
higher price per hour for parking and a tight time-limit may be what is needed. 
But the fairness dimensions—such as the payment ability of those who need 
parking for work—may counsel against it. Furthermore, political economy may 
 
 23. See id. at 532 (“[F]ree curb parking is not an effective way to help the poor, especially because many 
of the poorest people cannot afford cars.”). 
 24. See id. at 534 (discussing how money gleaned from higher parking rates can be used to finance major 
public improvements). 
 25. For a critique of access justice regulations, see generally Omri Ben-Shahar, The Paradox of Access 
Justice, and Its Application to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1755 (2016). 
 26. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2015 ACS 1-Year Estimates, https://www.census.gov/programs-
surveys/acs/technical-documentation/table-and-geography-changes/2015/1-year.html (last updated Nov. 17, 
2016). 
 27. See KNEEBONE & HOLMES, supra note 13. 
 28. Nicole Perlroth, How Tech Companies Disrupted Silicon Valley’s Restaurant Scene, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/19/technology/how-tech-companies-disrupted-silicon-valleys-
restaurant-scene.html. For an account of the challenges of commuting via public transportation in the Bay Area, 
see Conor Dougherty & Andrew Burton, A 2:15 Alarm, 2 Trains and a Bus Get Her to Work by 7 A.M., N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/17/business/economy/san-francisco-commute.html.  
 29. Dalmas, supra note 4. 
 30. Id.  
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counsel against it as people have often rallied against any surge in parking 
prices.31  
B. CURBSIDE PARKING ALLOCATION: THE FIRST-IN-TIME RULE AS APPLIED 
TO CURBSIDE PARKING 
Curbside parking allocation is a great contemporary example of the rule of 
capture for wild animals. Curbside parking is normally open to everyone but, for 
obvious reasons, cannot be used by everyone at the same time.32 As a result, 
allocation rules are necessary. In general, the first to get into a vacant parking 
spot gets it.33 The need to occupy the parking spot also approximates the first-
in-time rule as applied to curbside parking to the rule of capture illustrated by 
Judge Tompkin’s opinion in the well-known case Pierson v. Post.34 After all, 
the first to drive into a vacant spot gets it even if a second driver had been driving 
in circles for a longer time or has a more pressing need for parking. There is no 
legal remedy available to the second driver, much as there was none for Post, 
who had been chasing the fox with hounds.35 
However, there are qualifications to the rule of capture when it comes to 
curbside parking. For instance, once a car is backing into a parking spot, social 
norms dictate that another car will not enter head on to prevent the car backing 
from getting the spot.36 Also, the driver of a car idling double-parked in wait of 
the first vacant spot, is generally given preference by fellow drivers. This 
particular social norm rewards the patience of the driver in the idling car even if 
the waiting may create congestion. Note that a car idling is easily observable by 
other drivers, as opposed to one driving in circles, and this allows for a smooth 
enforcement of the rule. To some extent, the qualifications explained in this 
 
 31. Don Behm, Proposed Parking Fees in Milwaukee County Parks Draws Protests, J. SENTINEL 
(Milwaukee) (Feb. 7, 2018, 1:41 PM), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/local/milwaukee/2018/02/06/ 
proposed-parking-fees-milwaukee-county-parks-draw-protesters-meeting/308437002/; Nick Wilson, Cal Poly 
Employees Protest Increased Parking Fees, TRIBUNE (San Luis Obispo) (July 31, 2014, 5:55 PM), 
http://www.sanluisobispo.com/news/local/education/article39492741.html.  
 32. Elinor Ostrom described parking as a common pool resource where the resource units appropriated are 
the parking spots. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 32 (1990). 
 33. This applies to curbside parking. Allocations of other forms of parking follow different rules or norms. 
For example, you may only let your friends park in your driveway or, in residents-only parking areas, the first-
in-time principle may apply, but only those who possess a residential parking permit can be first. Parkingin 
its broadest sense encompassing all forms of parking, public or private, in-street or off-streetcould be labeled 
as a semi-commons, albeit a markedly complex one. The term semi-commons is used to refer to a resource 
managed combining both private property and communal property. Henry Smith’s ultimate example of semi-
commons is the medieval open field in Northern Europe, where grazing arrangements were reached within a 
system of land ownership combining private lands with communal ones. Henry E. Smith, Semicommon 
Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 132 (2000). In parking, the commons 
would be represented by curbside parking, while private property would consist of property rights over home 
garages or in public garages. Very different regimes govern each of these forms of parking.  
 34. 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
 35. Id. at 177. 
 36. Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
S515, S524 (2002). 
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paragraph reflect concerns Judge Livingston articulated in his dissenting opinion 
in Pierson v. Post. According to Judge Livingston, after investing in the pursuit 
and coming close to the capture, a hunter has a right to the prey and anyone 
interfering should be considered a wrongdoer.37 
The ease of administering the first-in-time principle comes at a cost, failing 
to take into account the differential value to particular drivers of particular 
parking spots. It rewards those who can wait to find a parking spot.38 It also fails 
to account for the amount of business those particular drivers may bring to the 
neighborhood. These considerations become more salient as parking becomes 
scarcer. Additionally, the first-in-time rule unaccompanied by any other 
regulation makes parking a commons and contributes to scarcity. If parking is 
free, demand will be higher than supply. In fact, Hardin in the celebrated article 
The Tragedy of the Commons, uses a curbside parking example.39 During the 
Christmas shopping season, the municipality of Leominster (Massachusetts) let 
everyone park for free. They announced the decision by covering the plastic 
meters with a bag and a note that read: “Do not open until after Christmas. Free 
parking courtesy of the mayor and city council.”40 Notwithstanding the 
ingenuity of the idea and even its political sharpness,41 making a scarce resource 
free results in overexploitation. While Hardin does not spell out what happened, 
 
 37. Pierson, 3 Cai. at 180–81 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 38. Parking difficulties similarly explain the existence of valets. Regulations are in place to prevent valets 
from parking on the curbside, further exacerbating the scarcity. Joel Grover & Matthew Glasser, Nowhere to 
Park: Valets Caught Swiping Spots from Drivers, NBC LOS ANGELES (May 24, 2016, 12:25 AM), 
https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Los-Angeles-Valet-Service-Parking-Meters-LAPD-
380533111.html (“A City of Los Angeles Ordinance prohibits valets from parking customers’ cars in the ‘public 
right of way,’ which includes parking meters and on side streets. The ordinance says valet companies must prove 
to the city that they have space in parking lots for their customers’ cars.”); see also L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 
X, art. III, §§ 103.203, 103.203.1 (2018). The next step in the valet world were apps like Luxe or Zirx. Their 
business models consisted of picking up cars at the drivers’ destinations, parking the cars in the outskirts or 
wherever cheaper parking was available, and delivering the cars back to the drivers as requested. Consider, for 
example, Luxe, an app-based valet company from San Francisco. LUXE, http://luxe.com/about (last visited Jan. 
19, 2019). Its hourly rates varied by city and depended on the price of street parking. Farhad Manjoo, Luxe Valet 
App Eliminates the Headache of Finding a Parking Spot, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2014, 1:00 PM), 
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/17/valet-parking-apps-eliminate-the-headache-of-finding-a-spot/. 
Luxe’s valet service was discontinued in early 2017, and Volvo acquired the startup. Greg Kumparak, Luxe to 
End Door-to-Door Valet Service, Will Launch ‘New Service’ This Summer, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 26, 2017), 
https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/26/luxe-to-end-door-to-door-valet-service-in-san-francisco-at-the-end-of-
may/; Ingrid Lunden, Volvo Acquires Car Valet Startup Luxe to Boost Its Digital Services Business, 
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 8, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/08/volvo-acquires-car-valet-startup-luxe-to-
boost-its-digital-services-business/. For information on Zirx, see Kia Kokalitcheva, Why This Valet Parking 
Startup Gave Up on Its Uber-Like Service, FORTUNE (Apr. 11, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/11/why-zirx-
ditched-consumer-facing-parking-service/. Zirx now focuses on business to business services, such as moving, 
fueling, or washing cars for businesses like rental car companies. Megan Rose Dickey, Mobility Services 
Platform Stratim, Formerly Known as Zirx, Sells to KAR, TECHCRUNCH, 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/02/07/mobility-services-platform-stratim-formerly-known-as-zirx-sells-to-kar/ 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 39. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 (1968). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  
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it is likely that the measure translated into a lower turnover rate of patrons that 
damaged the businesses. 
In cities where parking is undersupplied, the first-in-time principle needs 
to be modified. The most common way of allocating parking has been to add 
either a time-limit, a price, or both, on top of the first-in-time principle. The 
driver who finds a parking spot gets it, but she normally needs to be willing to 
pay some hourly price and/or be willing to move the car after the time limit has 
expired (for example, after two hours). The driver may still decide to overstay 
in the spot, but then the price ramps up because she may receive a fine if a 
parking control officer catches the overstay. Parking control officers in some 
municipalities marked the tires with chalk to fight against those gaming the 
system and not abiding by the time-limit by simply re-feeding the parking meter 
to re-start the time-limit.42 The driver who pays for four hours is not necessarily 
impacting municipal revenue, but the time-limit exists to ensure turnover. 
Beyond the interest of these anecdotes, the rigor with which municipalities 
enforce parking rules matters. If it is strictly enforced, one should forget about 
curbside parking for medical or dental appointments (the duration of which is as 
unpredictable as the copayment due) or for certain home services (such as the 
ones provided by plumbers or electricians). Strict enforcement has been made 
easier with recent technological innovations that allow for municipalities to 
enforce the limits easily using sensors.43 
The hourly price tends to be artificially cheap according to economists. If 
the price was based on the market, rather than the municipality-set price, prices 
would be much higher.44 Today in many municipalities, the price to park is a 
nominal fee of one or two dollars per hour, which is far cheaper than the public 
garages nearby.45 In congested New York City, of the more than four million 
parking spots, a mere 81,875 are metered parking.46 In Fort Worth (Texas), the 
curbside hourly fee for parking on Houston St. (in downtown) is $1.25.47 In 
Boston, the city did not increase parking hour-fees for decades,48 even though 
the number of automobiles and demand for parking obviously rose.  
 
 42. Gary Richards, Roadshow: Chalk Sticks, Cameras and Other Ways to Enforce Parking Time Limits, 
MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 25, 2013, 5:59 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2013/10/25/roadshow-chalk-sticks-
cameras-and-other-ways-to-enforce-parking-time-limits/. 
 43. Rafael Avitabile & Gaby Rodriguez, City Testing Validation Sensors on Hillcrest Parking Meters, 
NBC SAN DIEGO (Mar. 25, 2017, 9:41 AM), http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local/City-Testing-Validation-
Sensors-on-Hillcrest-Parking-Meters-417088983.html. 
 44. Gretchen Gavett et al., Why It’s Fair to Save a Parking Spot—for a Price, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 28, 
2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/why-its-fair-to-save-a-parking-spot-for-a-price. 
 45. See Gregory Pierce et al., Optimizing the Use of Public Garages: Pricing Parking by Demand, 44 
TRANSPORT POL’Y 89, 91 (2015). 
 46. Noah Kazis, New York Has 81,875 Metered Parking Spots, and Millions of Free Ones, NYC STREETS 
BLOG (Mar. 22, 2011), https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2011/03/22/new-york-has-81875-metered-parking-spaces-
and-millions-of-free-ones. 
 47. Parking Meters, CITY OF FORT WORTH, http://fortworthtexas.gov/parking/meters/ (last visited Jan. 19, 
2019). 
 48. Patrick Doyle, Why Parking in Boston Should Be More Expensive, BOS. MAG. (Oct. 30, 2012, 4:11 
AM), http://www.bostonmagazine.com/2012/10/the-take-parking-in-boston/. 
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Cheap curbside parking means that the cost of finding a parking spot 
involves both time and money. Only those that can afford to spend time circling 
may access a parking spot. Time may be a poor proxy for value. Those who 
cannot spend time searching for a spot, would have to find a spot in a public 
garage, use a valet service to do that for them, or take a taxi or ride-sharing 
service. Valets are normally required to park in places other than the curbside;49 
so a service that parks your car on the curbside by driving it around until one 
spot opens—like those who pay someone to stand for them in the Supreme Court 
line waiting to attend a hearing50—is not lawful.  
C.  EXTERNALITIES FROM CURRENT ALLOCATION: CONGESTION AND 
POLLUTION 
Searching for a parking spot not only costs time and money to the driver, 
but also to the rest of us. Where parking is cheap, drivers may park for a longer 
period than if it were more expensive, while others who have more pressing 
business and would be willing to pay more for parking cannot park and cannot 
spend the extra time waiting for a spot. This may translate into less commerce. 
But parking allocation has further effects on congestion where it is scarce and 
underpriced. 
While in some areas oversupply of parking is the problem,51 in crowded 
downtowns, congestion as a result of parking scarcity and low prices presents a 
different challenge. Congestion is an externality that cities need to address. The 
extra congestion added by those searching for parking implies that those wanting 
to park are spending time but also that fellow drivers are stuck in traffic longer. 
While it may be efficient for the person searching for parking to spend time 
looking for a cheap spot from his individual viewpoint, the extra road time other 
drivers must spend as a result generates opportunity costs, such as lost business 
for the shops downtown.  
Research shows that a city dweller may spend up to four years of their life 
looking for parking.52 In San Francisco, it was estimated that the total search 
 
 49. See, e.g., L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ch. X, art. III, div. 8, §§ 103.203, 103.203.1 (2018). 
 50. Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court to Lawyers: Hold Your Own Place in Line, NPR (Oct. 6, 2015, 2:50 
PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/10/06/446359539/supreme-court-to-lawyers-hold-your-
own-place-in-line. 
 51. Oversupply is a common problem for store parking lots in shopping malls. These lots are sized to 
accommodate a Thanksgiving-size volume of shoppers and, as a result, vast areas of land are asphalted, although 
most days only a small fraction of the space is used. Sarah Kobos, So Many Shoppers, So Much Unused Parking, 
STRONG TOWNS (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.strongtowns.org/journal/2015/12/1/so-many-shoppers-so-much-
unused-parking. 
 52. See Elfrink, supra note 1. 
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time for a parking spot per driver was 6.5 minutes.53 Shoup found that people 
cruising in search of parking explains up to 30% of the traffic near UCLA.54 
Every extra car on the road slows traffic. The amount of additional 
drivingand the resulting additional congestionis difficult to overstate:  
In one study of a fifteen-block stretch of New York City’s Upper West Side, 
motorists were estimated to “cruise” a total of 366,000 miles a year searching 
for street parking—farther, the study noted, than a one-way trip to the moon.55 
In addition, congestion means extra driving and extra driving means more 
vehicle emissions.56 Transportation emissions are a serious threat.57 They 
include, among others, greenhouse gases, volatile organic compounds, and 
particulate matter. Whether a city wants to be at the forefront of climate change 
policy or solve a local smog problem, it will need to tackle vehicle congestion. 
While cities have dealt with congestion through initiatives such as congestion 
pricing in the city centers,58 or allowing only odd or even plate-numbered cars 
on certain days,59 managing parking appropriately is also a good candidate to 
help with congestion.  
A more expensive parking fee would reduce externalities but it will also 
result in affordability problems for those with less disposable income who, for 
example, may need to park to go to the doctor. Managing parking implies 
juggling the competing demands of commerce, political participation, fairness, 
and the population who is used to cheap parking. The conflict of managing 
parking runs even deeper when the municipality tries to tackle congestion as 
well as pollution.60 For any economist, a high price is a natural candidate to 
address scarcity and its associated costs. However, the economist’s recipes to 
solving parking issues must take into account the principles that underlie public 
 
 53. SHOUP, supra note 22, at 288 (quoting Steve Rubinstein, Auto Alternative / Car-sharing Program Can 
Free S.F. Drivers from Parking Hassles, S.F. GATE (Mar. 9, 2001, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Auto-Alternative-Car-sharing-program-can-free-2944037.php (“You 
spend half of your life driving around looking for parking in this town, which is bad for your marriage.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Donald C. Shoup, Cruising for Parking, 13 TRANSPORT POL’Y 479, 480 (2006). 
 54. Donald Shoup, Cruising for Parking, ACCESS, Spring 2007, at 16, 17. 
 55. Streitfeld, supra note 8. 
 56. The Environmental Impact Review of a parking structure at the University of California-Los Angeles 
concludes that each new parking spot imposes $117 in external costs. SHOUP, supra note 22, at 195–97 
(attributing $73 to congestion costs and $44 to emission costs). 
 57. Motor Vehicle Pollution, MINN. POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY, 
https://www.pca.state.mn.us/air/motor-vehicle-pollution (last visited Jan. 19, 2019); Vehicles, Air Pollution, and 
Human Health, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-vehicles/vehicles-air-pollution-
and-human-health#.W5wGSy2ZNo4 (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).  
 58. Neal Baker, Wheels of Fortune: What Time Does the London Congestion Charge Start and End, What 
Are the Bank Holiday and Weekend Rules and What’s the T-Charge?, SUN (Mar. 20, 2018, 10:53 PM), 
https://www.thesun.co.uk/motors/3251046/london-congestion-charge-timings-bank-holiday-t-charge/. 
 59. David Chazan, How Paris Is Stepping Up Its Drive Against the Car, BBC NEWS (May 2, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-36169815; Mexico City Mobility Challenge, DEVPOST, https://mexicocity-
mobility.devpost.com/details/resources (last visited Jan. 19, 2019).  
 60. Pierce and Shoup describe the variable pricing for parking program in San Francisco, which aims at 
reducing congestion by ensuring that there are some vacant spots at all times. This aim, they point out, conflicts 
with the parking policy goal of increasing turnover to ensure commerce. Pierce & Shoup, supra note 5, at 23.  
70.2-PEREZ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2019  12:33 PM 
380 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:367 
property. The next Part will present those principles and Part III will analyze 
how the economist recipes for parking fare against those principles.  
II.  CURBSIDE PARKING AS A NON-FULLY COMMODIFIABLE GOOD  
A.  THE LEGAL DIMENSION OF CURBSIDE PARKING: THE PARKING-METER 
CASES AND THE DUTY OF THE MUNICIPALITY TO MANAGE PUBLIC 
STREETS IN TRUST FOR THE PUBLIC AND FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Sharing-economy initiatives regarding curbside parking do not operate in 
the same regulatory void that ride-sharing or home-sharing did at their 
inceptions. While other sharing-economy initiatives required the development 
of a new regulatory framework,61 curbside parking sharing had to, at the very 
least, respect the existing ordinances and the principles set forth for parking 
meters, as well as those in connection with any other form of monetization or 
privatization of curbside parking.  
In 1935, Oklahoma City installed the world’s first parking meter, Park-O-
Meter No. 1, invented by Carl Magee, on the southeast corner of what was then 
First Street and Robinson Avenue.62 This and other early parking meters in 
Oklahoma City cost a nickel an hour, and were placed at twenty-foot intervals 
along the curb matching the spaces painted on the pavement.63  
The installation of the first parking meters marked the start of the use of 
prices to regulate curbside parking. Since then, parking-meters have been the 
object of anger for many city dwellers and visitors. Early on, for instance, some 
labeled these meters “Un-American.”64 And, more importantly for current 
purposes, the parking-meter controversy reached the judicial system shortly 
after parking-meters started to pop up in cities across the nation. In 1937, 
Alabama,65 Massachusetts,66 and Oklahoma67 all rendered decisions on this 
issue. A fourth important decision, this time from Pennsylvania, came in 1943.68 
The judicial decisions on the parking-meter cases hinged on a central 
principle: public roads (or streets) must be managed in trust for the public. 
Hence, this principle limits any use affecting curbside parking. This holds true 
for any form of monetization (including variable pricing) or privatization 
(including the decentralized appropriation of parking spaces via apps). Parking-
 
 61. See generally Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y. Gen., Remarks Prepared for the Sharing City, Sharing 
Economy: Urban Law and New Economy Conference, A New Regulatory Paradigm for the Sharing Economy 
(Apr. 24, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/A_New_Regulatory_Paradigm_for_the_Sharing_Economy_4_24_ 
15.pdf.  
 62. Shoup, supra note 7, at 65–66.  
 63. Id.; This Day in History: July 16, 1935, World’s First Parking Meter Installed, HIST. (Jan. 27, 2010), 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/worlds-first-parking-meter-installed. 
 64. Cynthia Crossen, When Parallel Parking Was New and Meters Seemed Un-American, WALL ST. J. 
(July 30, 2007, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB118574808780081653. 
 65. See City of Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 172 So. 114, 123 (Ala. 1937). 
 66. See In re Op. of the Justices, 8 N.E.2d 179, 182 (Mass. 1937). 
 67. See Ex parte Duncan, 65 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Okla. 1937). 
 68. See William Laubach & Sons v. City of Easton, 32 A.2d 881, 884 (Pa. 1943). 
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meter cases offer very broad formulations of the limits to parking management 
decisions in dicta. Where the parking-meter cases are insufficient to provide 
responses for the current challenges of parking, one must take into consideration 
the valuable insights that the judicial decisions dealing with the trust concept as 
applied to public resources different from curbside parking provide.  
1. The Massachusetts Parking-Meter Case: In re Opinion of the 
Justices  
In 1937, the Massachusetts legislature requested the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court to issue an opinion on the lawfulness of the bill to enact a long-
titled act: Act Authorizing the Purchase, Installation, Operation and 
Maintenance of Devices Known as Parking Meters by Cities and Towns for the 
Purpose of Enforcing Ordinances, By-Laws, Orders, Rules and Regulations 
Relative to the Parking of Vehicles on Public Ways, and the Establishing of and 
Charging a Fee for the Privilege of Parking Vehicles on Certain Public Ways.69 
The court held in its decision in In re Opinion of the Justices that parking meters 
were lawful but that:  
A municipality cannot be authorized to turn this plan of using parking meters 
into a business for profit over and above the expenses involved in proper 
regulation of the public use. It cannot establish a commercial enterprise on the 
public easement.70  
The first part of the last sentence of the quotation (“[i]t cannot establish a 
commercial enterprise”) clearly states that the municipalities cannot seek a 
profitable business out of curbside parking, neither for themselves nor for a 
contractor.71 The second part (“on the public easement”) needs some explanation 
to further grasp its meaning. To begin with, the reference to public easement is 
linking the regulation of curbside parking to that of travel on public roads, which 
are encumbered by an easement held by the public.72 In other words, parking is 
incidental to the purpose of the travel easement.73 This is not just a technicality, 
for travel to be possible, access needs to be granted to the public road and 
because parking is linked to travel, access to parking needs to also be granted.74 
Much as the owner of a servient estate must respect the right of way of the owner 
of a landlocked dominant estate, the municipality must grant the public access 
 
 69. H.R. 745, 1937 Gen. Court (Mass. 1937).  
 70. In re Op. of the Justices, 8 N.E.2d at 182.  
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 181 (“The easement of travel is coextensive with the limits of the highway, and includes every 
reasonable means of passage and transportation for persons and commodities and of transmission of 
intelligence.”).  
 73. Id. at 182 (“Doubtless temporary and reasonable stops of automobiles on highways are lawful as an 
incident to travel.”).  
 74. Id.  
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to the public roads (or streets); this duty extends to curbside parking, not just the 
section of the road used by moving vehicles.75 
The court further established that the use of parking meters was limited by 
the rights of the abutters.76 In this regard, parking meters are no different from 
water pipes or power poles.77 The municipality does not own the fee of the 
streets, but an easement to run pipes, install poles, or operate meters without 
infringing the rights of the abutters, including the right of access.78  
Considering all of the above, the court emphasized some outer limits that 
municipal ordinances implementing the Act had to respect. In particular, it 
considered that parking meters’ payments could only meet the cost of the 
installation, operation, maintenance, and supervision of the system.79 Profit-
making was considered alien to the public purpose that would justify the exercise 
of eminent domain.80 In a similar vein, the court analogized exacting 
compensation for curbside parking with tolls, which are justified as paying for 
the special service rendered, and not considered to infringe on the rights of 
individuals in public ways.81 Lastly, and while not central to the case, the court 
pointed out that outsourcing parking to a private company might run against the 
principles governing public roads.82 But some of the court’s statements open the 
possibility of covering more than just costs with the fees. The decision states: 
“A municipality cannot be authorized to turn this plan of using parking meters 
into a business for profit over and above the expenses involved in proper 
regulation of the public use.”83 Accordingly, with an expansive interpretation, 
pollution and congestion could be included in expenses related to the proper 
regulation of public use. 
 
 75. Id. at 181 (“Abutting owners ordinarily hold the title to the fee to the center of the public way, subject 
only to the easement of travellers [sic] to pass and repass. This easement of travel has been interpreted in a broad 
sense. . . . [and] [w]hatever is done within the limits of the highway by the public or by members of it not 
justifiable as incidental to travel is a violation of the rights of the abutting owner.” (emphasis added)). 
 76. Id. at 182 (“An ordinance which allowed such parking as would interfere with reasonable access to his 
premises from the public way by the abutter would be invalid. Even where the abutter does not own the fee of 
the public way he is entitled to reasonable access to the way from his land and to his land from the way.”).  
 77. Id. at 181.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 182.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. at 182–83. 
 82. Id. at 183 (“There is ground for argument that the proposed statute in section 1 [of 1937 Massachusetts 
House Bill No. 745] authorizes a municipality to farm out to strangers the running of the system, but we are 
inclined to think that that would not be its proper construction.”). Section 1 of the 1937 proposed House Bill 
allowed for  
the installation, operation and maintenance . . . of . . . parking meters . . . for the control and 
regulation of traffic on ways within [the city’s] control. Such a contract may provide for payments 
by such cities and towns over a period not exceeding five years, and any obligation of such cities and 
towns created by such a contract shall not be deemed a liability . . . . 
H.B. 745, 1937 Gen. Court (Mass. 1937).  
 83. In re Op. of the Justices, 8 N.E.2d at 182.  
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2. The Alabama Curbside-Parking Case: City of Birmingham v. Hood-
McPherson Realty Co. 
The main claim of the plaintiffs in City of Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson 
Realty Co.84 was that the local ordinance establishing parking meters interfered 
with private landowners’ right to access their properties.85 The plaintiff in the 
case was a real estate company, which had already been granted an injunction 
against the City of Birmingham’s ordinance authorizing the installation of 
parking meters. According to the Ordinance: 
The five cent coins required to be deposited as provided herein are levied under 
the police power of the City of Birmingham to regulate and control traffic upon 
the public streets, and to cover the costs of such regulation and control, and the 
same shall be used for no other purpose.86 
The plaintiff alleged that the ordinance constituted a taking of property and 
that the parking meters on the street were an obstruction or nuisance. The 
plaintiff further considered itself to have been deprived of the right to go in and 
out of its commercial establishment and to park vehicles alongside their 
property.87  
The Alabama Supreme Court paid little attention to the taking and nuisance 
arguments. Instead, the court chose to focus on the discussion of the scope of 
the municipalities’ regulatory powers when it came to curbside parking. Was it 
for the municipality to do anything other than, as the plaintiff would prefer, just 
paint the lines of the parking spaces? What if, as the plaintiff argued, the 
Ordinance was a “plan or scheme . . . to obtain revenue for the city?”88 Was this 
within the regulating powers of the municipality? And, most importantly, how 
should the original deed of the City be read when conveying “streets, avenues 
and alleys . . . for the benefit and use of the public?”89  
According to the court, the municipality was a mere trustee and, as such, 
was under a duty to pursue the clearly stated purpose of making the streets for 
the benefit and use of the public. The public was the beneficiary and, according 
to the court, was to be interpreted broadly to include more than just the people 
of the city.90 The trust narrative used by the court goes beyond the understanding 
 
 84. 172 So. 114, 118 (Ala. 1937). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 117 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 87. This factual pattern is actually what the Massachusetts court had in mind when it considered whether 
an ordinance that would affect the right to access one’s property would be valid.  
An ordinance which allowed such parking as would interfere with reasonable access to his premises 
from the public way by the abutter would be invalid. Even where the abutter does not own the fee of 
the public way he is entitled to reasonable access to the way from his land and to his land from the 
way. 
In re Op. of the Justices, 8 N.E.2d at 182. 
 88. Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 172 So. at 116 (emphasis omitted). 
 89. Id. at 118 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the City’s deed to the property at issue in the 
case). 
 90. Id. at 120.  
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of public property as just private property owned by the government—be it 
municipal, state, or federal.  
The court held that the Ordinance violated the City’s deed because parking 
would obstruct public use.91 Moreover, the court concluded that the Ordinance 
exceeded the powers of the municipality even though Birmingham had broader 
police powers than smaller municipalities. Police power over curbside parking 
allowed taxation with a regulatory aim. Taxation via parking fees, according to 
the court, could only extend to the amount necessary to cover regulatory and 
enforcement costs.92 To an extent, the definition of the court suggests that a 
municipality should regulate parking as a traditional utility, where the customer 
gets charged for the cost of service.93 The Ordinance, however, had gone beyond 
these boundaries.  
3. The Pennsylvania Parking-Meter Case: William Laubach & Sons v. 
City of Easton 
In 1943, in William Laubach & Sons v. City of Easton,94 the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court considered if it was a reasonable regulation to time-limit parking 
and to charge a small fee with the aim, not to raise revenue, but to defray the 
costs of special services.95 This case was initiated by two abutting property 
owners and a tax-payer challenging an ordinance of the City of Easton regarding 
curbside parking. The court acknowledged the change in conditions resulting 
from the rise of the automobile.96 It was in contemplation of those changes that 
the court justified cities having the power to regulate parking, in order to enhance  
 
 
 91. Id. at 122.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Erin A. Scharff, Green Fees: The Challenge of Pricing Externalities Under State Law, 97 NEB. L. REV. 
168, 176, 207 (2018). The cost of service regulation in investor-owned electric utilities is based on the idea that 
the utility is a public service firm. While historically rate-setting standards required “just and reasonable” rates, 
more recently these have translated into calculations of the total revenue requirement. See KARL MCDERMOTT, 
COST OF SERVICE REGULATION IN THE INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF 
ADAPTATION vii, 8 (2012), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=916E3E00CA202E964CE6E694997549A6?doi=10.1
.1.476.2757&rep=rep1&type=pdf. The formula to calculate the latter includes return on investment. Id. at 8. 
Rates account, thus, for the appropriate profit that stakeholders would receive in a market. Id. at 14. When 
regulators oversee utility rates and services, they take into account both the fairness and the efficiency of 
outcomes. Id. at 12. 
 94. 32 A.2d 881 (Pa. 1943).  
 95. The court stated: 
In the broad sense every ordinance which requires the payment of money is a revenue producing 
measure, but the primary purpose of ordinances such as this under consideration is the 
reimbursement of the city for providing special services to the licensees. . . . Though we may suppose 
the ordinance was imposed to increase the revenue, this does not invalidate it as a licensing ordinance 
if it clearly appears the city is seeking to compel the persons who cause expense to pay for it. 
Id. at 884 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Am. Baseball Club v. Philadelphia, 167 A. 891, 892 (Pa. 
1933)). 
 96. Id. at 883. 
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travel by the public.97 Far from seeing the ordinance as an attempt to raise 
revenue under the guise of police regulation, the court held that the ordinance 
was a valid exercise of the police power which the state had delegated to the 
municipality.98 
4. The Oklahoma Parking-Meter Case: Ex parte Duncan 
In Ex parte Duncan,99 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Oklahoma 
City’s parking ordinance was compatible with the right to free use of public 
highways. The case arose from a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner had been 
jailed for violating the parking ordinance. According to the court, the use of 
public highways was an absolute right, but parking on the street was a privilege 
that could be subject to a fee.100 The power to regulate curbside parking, in the 
court’s view, derived from the duty of the municipality to guarantee the free use 
of public highways.101  
5. Curbside Parking as Rose’s Inherently Public Property 
The parking-meter cases have some similarities with the ones reviewed by 
Carol Rose in her celebrated article The Comedy of the Commons.102 In the 
article, Rose explores the concept of inherently public property by looking at, 
among other resources, roadways and waterways, the highways for commerce.  
Inherently public property is not owned by either a private party or the 
state; it is owned by the public. As defined by Rose herself, it is “property 
collectively ‘owned’ and ‘managed’ by society at large, with claims independent 
and indeed superior to the claims of any purported governmental manager.”103 
Rose’s approach echoes the easements and trust concepts portrayed in the 
aforementioned parking decisions.104 The reference to the public as beneficiaries 
 
 97. The court reasoned:  
As Lord Ellenborough said in an early case, Rex v. Cross, 3 Camp. 224, 227: “No one can make a 
stable-yard of the King’s highway.” To paraphrase that statement as applied to the present day: “No 
one may make a public garage of a public highway.” That, however, is not the situation here, for 
today temporary and reasonable stops of motor cars are lawful incidents of travel. It would unduly 
interfere with convenient travel by motor car if one could not stop for a short interval for the 
accomplishment of the purpose or purposes of the trip. 
Id. at 883. This is also argued in the case of Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583 
(1926). In that case, “Mr. Justice McReynolds observed that: ‘The states are now struggling with new and 
enormously difficult problems incident to the growth of automotive traffic, and we should carefully refrain from 
interference unless and until there is some real, direct and material infraction of rights guaranteed by the federal 
Constitution.’” Ex parte Duncan, 65 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Okla. 1937) (citing Frost & Frost, 271 U.S. at 603 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting)). 
 98. William Laubach & Sons, 32 A.2d at 884. 
 99. 65 P.2d 1015. 
 100. Id. at 1017. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Rose, supra note 6. 
 103. Rose, supra note 6, at 720 (emphasis added). 
 104. See cases cited supra notes 65–68. 
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and to the duty of the municipalities to guarantee access to the public is evidence 
enough. 
Rose sees inherently public property as instrumental for commerce, and 
thus for socialization. According to her, this determines inherently public 
property’s legal regime: while government may own or manage that type of 
property, there are some lines it cannot cross.105 Similarly, the judicial decisions 
reviewed above see the status of curbside parking as only partially 
commodifiable goods that must be managed to enhance the public use of the 
roads, thus limiting a municipality’s parking management tools.106 
The principles summarized above and articulated in the cases constitute 
those limits. In their formulation, these principles are reminiscent of the state 
public trust doctrine.107 These principles should apply across any property held 
in trust by a public agency (but not state lands given to the states to raise revenue 
to fund schools and other services), including curbside parking held by 
municipalities. 
6. Lessons Beyond the Streets 
While the principles originating in the parking-meter cases are important, 
they alone do not provide enough guidance to fully analyze each tool in the 
economist’s portfolio for solving parking scarcity. Looking beyond parking to 
case-law and legislation regarding other public properties helps to illuminate and 
operationalize those principles.  
a. The Public Trust Doctrine: Illinois Central Railroad and Its 
Progeny 
The Public Trust Doctrine implies that certain resources are managed by 
government in trust for the general public and it has to preserve them for public 
use. The classic public trust doctrine case is Illinois Central Railroad v. 
Illinois.108 The facts of this old case are well-known. The state legislature of 
Illinois conferred on the Illinois Central Railroad Corporation the right to enter, 
possess, and use 1000 acres of submerged lands on Lake Michigan.109 In turn, 
Illinois Central Railroad Corporation agreed to pay to the state in perpetuity 7% 
of the earnings from the submerged land.110 After some time, however, the state 
legislature revoked the right,111 but Illinois Central Railroad continued acting as 
an owner.112 A lawsuit was then filed by the State Attorney General and the case 
eventually reached the United States Supreme Court, which sided with the State 
 
 105. Rose, supra note 6, at 721. 
 106. See cases cited supra notes 70–88. 
 107. See infra Subpart II.A.6.i. 
 108. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).  
 109. Id. at 454.  
 110. Id. at 448.  
 111. Id. at 449. 
 112. Id. at 438. 
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of Illinois.113 In confirming that the grant of the right was revocable, the Court 
reasoned that the harbor and the submerged lands were held in trust for the public 
and, consequently, the State could not relinquish control over them.114 The Court 
differentiated lands held in trust for the public from lands held by the state to 
increase revenue and stated that the former are “being held by the whole people 
for the purposes in which the whole people are interested.”115  
The Court also held that lands subject to the public trust could be alienated, 
in part, only if: (1) the alienation furthered the purpose of the public trust, for 
instance, by enhancing commerce;116 and (2) it did not impair the use of the 
remaining lands subject to the trust.117  
More than ninety years after Illinois Central Railroad, two other public 
trust doctrine cases were decided by the California Supreme Court and the Idaho 
Supreme Court, respectively.  
In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (better known as Mono 
Lake), the Supreme Court of California held that allocation of the Mono Lake 
water had to take into account both the human and environmental uses of the 
lake.118 These uses were protected under the public trust doctrine and the state 
had to reconsider water allocations in order to protect them. In its reasoning, the 
court also declared water rights to be usufructuary rights,119 a conceptualization 
that may prove helpful to address allocation of curbside parking. Curbside 
parking rights are also usufructuary rights that can be limited when preserving 
the interest of the public in the underlying resource requires it.  
In Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 
the main issue before the Idaho Supreme Court was whether an assignment of 
private rights over resources held in trust for the public should be allowed.120 In 
this case, the Idaho Department of Lands had entered into a renewable lease with 
the Panhandle Yacht Club for the construction and use of a docking facility in a 
navigable lake.121 The State of Idaho later challenged the lease. The court held 
that the lease did not violate the terms of the trust.122 The Idaho Supreme Court 
reached this conclusion after applying a two-part test. First, it inquired whether 
the grant to a private party was in aid of commerce or another trust purpose.123 
 
 113. Id. at 452–54.  
 114. Id. at 453–54; see also Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 445 (N.D. 
Ill. 1990) (“[C]ourts should be critical of attempts by the state to surrender valuable public resources to a private 
entity.”).  
 115. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 456.  
 116. Id. at 452–55.  
 117. Id. at 452 (stating that grants that “do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters 
remaining” are the ones that are upheld and considered a valid exercise of legislative power that is consistent 
with the public trust doctrine).  
 118. 658 P.2d 709, 732 (Cal. 1983).  
 119. Id. at 724 (citing Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (Cal. 1853)).  
 120. 671 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Idaho 1983). 
 121. Id. at 1087. 
 122. Id. at 1096. 
 123. Id. at 1089. 
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Second, it asked whether the grant substantially affected the public interest in 
the lands and water remaining. 124 This two-part test could inform the assessment 
of curbside parking measures taken by the local governments in order to help 
commerce, reduce congestion, or to achieve any other admissible trust purpose, 
by raising access concerns.  
b. In Trust for the Public: New York City Parks 
In the State of New York, parkland is statutorily impressed with a public 
trust, and any alienation or dedication to purposes other than as parkland requires 
legislative approval.125 In addition, if alienation (outright conversion of parkland 
to private use)126 occurs, land elsewhere has to be acquired to serve park 
purposes.127 With some modifications, this solution is transferable to curbside 
parking so that limitations on access to curbside parking—by making parking 
fees prohibitively expensive—must be offset by providing an alternative to those 
affected.  
Alienation is not the only statutorily-curbed action when it comes to New 
York parks. Even leases are off-limits, with only revocable licenses to third 
parties being allowed, provided they are for uses consistent with park trust 
purposes. The rationale behind such limitations is that, given that parks are held 
in trust, municipalities must retain full control.128 Cases involving restaurants 
run by private individuals and entities in New York City parks are illustrative of 
the specific implementation of the strict limitations resulting from the 
municipality holding such parks in trust.  
Privately-run restaurants are considered to serve a park purpose.129 Such 
categorization is attuned to the services restaurants supply: providing beverages, 
food, or a place to rest. These services help the people make the most out of their 
time in the park.  
But what about an expensive restaurant affordable only to some? At least 
one lower court has found that such a restaurant would not serve park purposes 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 2001) (“[O]ur 
law is well settled: dedicated park areas in New York are impressed with a public trust for the benefit of the 
people of the State. . . . That proposition is reflected both in our case law and in our statutes.” (citations omitted)).  
 126. Jefferson Siegel, Union Square Rehab on Hold After Opponents File Lawsuit, VILLAGER (Apr. 29, 
2008), http://thevillager.com/villager_260/unionsquarerehab.html. 
 127. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION & HISTORIC PRES., HANDBOOK ON THE ALIENATION AND 
CONVERSION OF MUNICIPAL PARKLAND IN NEW YORK 4, 13 (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://parks.ny.gov/publications/documents/AlienationHandbook2017.pdf (“State Parks supports a ‘no net loss 
of parkland’ policy and strongly encourages municipalities to include provisions for substitute parkland in all 
alienation bills.”). In cases where municipalities have received state grants, those municipalities must provide 
for substitute parkland if they alienate parkland. Id. at 14. 
 128. 9 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND REGULATION IN NEW YORK § 1:10.50 (William R. Ginsberg & Philip 
Weinberg eds., 2d ed. 2018).  
 129. 795 Fifth Ave. Corp. v. City of New York, 205 N.E.2d 850, 851 (N.Y. 1965) (“[T]he proof is very 
clear that there are, and for many years have been, restaurant and related facilities in public parks . . . and they 
are commonly regarded as appropriate.” (citation omitted)).  
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(it would be “in the park,” but not “of the park”), but would be a destination in 
itself.130 Conversely, the New York Court of Appeals considered that the Parks 
Commissioner had enough discretion to allow such a restaurant without the 
municipality losing too much control, because schedules, menu items, prices, 
and other business decisions were subject to approval by the municipality.131 In 
addition, the restaurant had to participate in community programs, use products 
from the park’s farmers market, and allow non-patrons to use the outdoor 
seating. Last but not least, the contract between the restaurant and the 
municipality included a termination at will clause.132 The Court of Appeals 
accepted a fancy restaurant, but only subject to extensive limitations.  
The high-end characteristic of a certain private use was also controversial 
in Damrosch Park, a park in the Upper West Side managed on behalf of the City 
by the Lincoln Center,133 but still subject to the public trust. The park was a 
venue for the NY Fashion Week, which implied that the park was accessible 
only by invitees of the event’s organizers.134 The public could not access the 
park during the weeks in which the event was taking place. Consistent with the 
strong feelings about certain public property, this exclusion was met with 
criticism by activists: one of them declared, “Private people aren’t supposed to 
be making money on [a park].”135 New York City Park Advocates sued the 
municipality and Lincoln Center based on public trust principles. Eventually, the 
case was settled without any recognition of wrongdoing, but the fashion event is 
no longer hosted in the park. Instead, more benches and plants were brought to 
the park.136 
One important caveat when analyzing the public trust principles as applied 
to New York City parks is that the state legislature may waive the protection 
altogether under some circumstances. This possibility is actually being put to the 
test in Willets West (Queens, New York City).137 There, the City dispensed with 
the requirement that parkland be for recreational uses, and allowed parkland to 
be used as a parking lot for the Mets complex.138 However, during Mayor 
Bloomberg’s administration, a redevelopment venture projected a mall being 
 
 130. Union Square Park Coal., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, No. 102734-12, 2013 WL  
308912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 25, 2013), rev’d, 966 N.Y.S.2d 669 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 131. Union Square Park Cmty. Coal., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 22 N.Y. 3d 648, 652–53 
(N.Y. Ct. App. 2014). 
 132. Union Square Park Coal., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 966 N.Y.S.2d 669 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2013).  
 133. According to the Lincoln Center’s financial statements, the Lincoln Center is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organization. Lincoln Center Federal Tax Return (2015), LINCOLN CTR., http://www.aboutlincolncenter.org/ 
pdfs/lcpa-990-fy2016-final.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 134. New York Fashion Week Booted out of Lincoln Center, CBS NEWS (Mar. 2, 2017, 10:57 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-york-fashion-week-booted-out-of-lincoln-center/. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Sarah Maslin Nir, Ruling May Be Death Knell for $3 Billion Queens Development, N.Y. TIMES (June 
6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/06/nyregion/judges-block-plan-for-mall-and-housing-near-
citifield.html. 
 138. Id. 
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built on that same parkland.139 A legal dispute followed, and a court invalidated 
the project.140 But the New York Supreme Court left the door open for a potential 
legislative decision to turn things around.141 The court recognized implicitly 
that, much like the public trust doctrine in environmental law, the principles 
governing public property managed in trust for the public must be both resistant 
to, and malleable by, societal142 and technological143 change. The court 
recognized that the public of Queens was better served by a redevelopment, 
including a commercial mall, rather than by that parkland.144 It is possible that 
public benefit purposes include the improvement of trade and commerce.145 But 
it rests on the legislature to decide whether the redevelopment project furthers 
commerce because, under current legislation, the exemption requires those 
ancillary commercial purposes to be tied to the stadium.146 
7. Limits on the Management of Public Property 
Public property is not simply private property owned by a public entity. 
With the exception of state lands granted to raise funds for state school systems, 
the nature of public property entails that the public agency managing it cannot 
act as a private owner would. Public property is subject to public use. The public 
agency acts as a trustee for the public. Streets are public property and they are 
managed to ensure that the public can use the roads. As such, based on the case-
law discussed above on parking meters and other public property, the regulation 
of curbside parking must be consistent with particular principles, specifically: 
(1) pricing should only cover costs related to parking; (2) pricing may be used 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. In re Avella v. City of New York, 80 N.E.3d 982, 992 (N.Y. 2017). 
 141. See Nix, supra note 137 (“The decision does allow a window of possibility for the project: The state 
could pass legislation to permit building on the parkland.”). 
 142. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 
MICH. L. REV. 471, 476–77 (1970). 
 143. Karl S. Coplan, Public Trust Limits on Greenhouse Gas Trading Schemes: A Sustainable Middle 
Ground?, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 287, 321 (2010) (“As technology, and the potential for cap-and-trade, makes 
aspects of the atmosphere subject to private ownership, the public trust doctrine should similarly evolve to 
include these interests in the public trust responsibilities of the sovereign, such as creating the system of private 
rights.”). 
 144. The court stated: 
  We acknowledge that the remediation of Willets Point is a laudable goal. Defendants and various 
amici dedicate substantial portions of their briefs to the propositions that the Willets West 
development would immensely benefit the people of New York City, by transforming the area into 
a new, vibrant community, and that the present plan might be the only means to accomplish that 
transformation. Those contentions, however, have no place in our consideration of whether the 
legislature granted authorization for the development of Willets West on land held in the public trust. 
Of course, the legislature remains free to alienate all or part of the parkland for whatever purposes it 
sees fit, but it must do so through direct and specific legislation that expressly confers the desired 
alienation. 
In re Avella, 80 N.E.3d at 991.  
 145. Id. at 986–87 (quoting N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, ch. 1, § 18-118(b) (2018)). 
 146. ADMIN. § 18-118(b); In re Avella, 80 N.E.3d at 988; In re Avella v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.S.3d 
358, 361 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). 
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for a regulatory aim, but not for revenue raising; (3) any revenue obtained should 
be earmarked for use on curbside parking or related issues; (4) the municipality 
cannot lose control of the public property, and must even retain some sort of 
control when the property is leased, and (5) only partial alienation is admissible, 
and only if some substitute goods are provided, or the partial alienation will 
enhance the goals of the trust.  
B.  THE COMMUNITY DIMENSION OF CURBSIDE PARKING: A GOOD FOR THE 
PUBLIC 
The negative reaction to paying higher fees at the parking meters,147 the 
privatization of parking meters,148 and the labeling of the parking apps as 
#jerktech149 shows how difficult any reform based on the economic recipes 
stated in Part III will be to implement. The negative responses to high parking 
prices can be just another expression of the endowment effect.150 
Notwithstanding the endowment effect, resulting from the change of enjoying 
free or cheap curbside parking to having to pay for it—and being unwilling to 
do so151—the negative reactions can also be read as reflecting the community 
dimension that parking may have152 and internalizing the principles set forth 
above. Other anecdotal evidence seems to point to the existence and relevance 
of such community dimension. Take, for instance, the public opposition to 
private companies taking over the management of meters.  
This community dimension translates to more than just the endowment 
effect and the rejection of high parking fees. A great expression of this 
community dimension is the good Samaritans who feed about-to-expire meters 
for others, and thus help fellow anonymous parkers from being fined. Most 
likely, good Samaritans (or meter-feeding fairies) are driven by the conviction 
that fines are excessive, and that not even the municipality should profit from 
curbside parking,153 it being instrumental for locals and visitors alike to go on 
with their lives.154 The idea of preventing excessive profit from parking links 
 
 147. Kristi Palma, Boston Drivers Chafe at City’s Pricier Parking Meter Rates, BOSTON.COM (Jan. 4, 2017), 
https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2017/01/04/boston-drivers-chafe-at-citys-pricier-parking-meter-
rates. 
 148. Stefanie Fisher, Chicago City Hall Protest Demands End to Parking Meter Expansion, LIBERATION 
(Aug. 4, 2009), https://www.liberationnews.org/09-08-04-chicago-city-hall-protest-demand-html/. 
 149. See Josh Constine, Stop the JerkTech, TECHCRUNCH (July 3, 2014), 
https://techcrunch.com/2014/07/03/go-disrupt-yourself/; Tim Harford, What Tech Jerks Can Teach Us, FIN. 
TIMES (July 25, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/6bc48790-1201-11e4-a17a-00144feabdc0.  
 150. Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 
193, 203 (1991); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 
76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729 (1986). 
 151. Shoup, supra note 7, at 12.  
 152. MARUSEK, supra note 3, at 6. 
 153. For an account of increased fines in Chicago and the public reaction, see Steve Rhodes, Fight the 
Parking Power!, NBC CHI. (June 4, 2009, 3:30 AM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/Fight-The-
Parking-Power-.html. 
 154. This was part of the reaction to Chicago’s lease of the meters, but in Chicago it is not illegal. Anthony 
Todd, Parking Meter Samaritans, Watch Out!, CHICAGOIST (Apr. 3, 2009, 2:40 PM), 
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with the first judicial decisions on parking meters.155 On the other hand, 
municipalities claim that they need to stop meter fairies not because their parking 
revenue will decrease, but because they must protect local business by ensuring 
customer turnover. The acts of the meter fairies reduce the volume of patrons 
for local businesses.156 Ensuring turnover is one of the goals of parking policies.  
Some good Samaritans have local celebrity status. In Santa Cruz, 
California, a clown was well known for feeding parking meters to prevent the 
parking enforcement officers from fining those drivers who overstayed.157 
However, the municipality did not share the joy of the clown as the recipients of 
his generosity did.158 Or, at least, so suggests the passing of an ordinance 
forbidding meter feeding (known as the “Anti-Good-Samaritan Ordinance”) and 
the subsequent ticket and court citation to the defiant clown.159 The response of 
the people from Santa Cruz forced the municipality to repeal the ordinance.160 
The fact that the municipality was so opposed to the good Samaritan, even 
though it was getting the corresponding parking revenue (regardless of the 
source), raises the question of whether the municipality was counting on a 
certain rate of non-compliance and fine collection to bring much needed funds 
to the city coffers. Filling the city coffers with parking fines does not match the 
principles guiding the management of public streets, as Subpart II.A explains. 
Similarly, many municipalities forbid drivers to transfer for free their time-
limited right to park on a metered spot when they have not used up their time.161 
In fact, some city councils have invested in sensors to reset the parking meter 
 
http://chicagoist.com/2009/04/03/parking_meter_samaritans_watch_out.php. In Santa Cruz, Twister the Clown 
was fined for filling the parking meter of others. However, he won the battle because Santa Cruz ended up 
repealing the regulation. Ellen Knickmeyer, No Joking Matter: Clown Wins Meter-Feeding Battle as City 
Council Caves in to Ridicule, FREE LANCE STAR, Oct. 27, 1995, at A12. In Los Angeles, it is illegal to feed your 
meter once the time limit has expired. Michael Russnow, You Can Be Ticketed for Feeding a Parking Meter 
After the Time Limit: How Many People Really Know?, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-russnow/you-can-be-ticketed-for-f_b_111120.html. 
 155. See supra Subpart II.A for the early decisions on parking meters.  
 156. Katherine Mozzone, ‘Meter Fairy’ Told He Can’t Feed Other People’s Parking Meters, KQRE NEWS 
13 (Sept. 7, 2015, 7:50 AM), http://krqe.com/2015/09/07/meter-fairy-told-he-cant-feed-other-peoples-parking-
meters/. 
 157. Mr. Twister Turns Parking Resister, CNN (Oct. 18, 1995, 1:25 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9510/clown_rally/index.html. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id.; Clown Cashes in on Public Outcry as City Parks Meter-Feeding Ban, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1995, 
at A26. 
 160. Mr. Twister Turns Parking Resister, supra note 157. 
 161. Piggybacking on someone else’s parking meter is a common practice. City ordinances outlaw such a 
practice implicitly. But it may be a provision hard to enforce. The Los Angeles City Code states:  
It shall be unlawful for any person to park, or to cause, allow, permit or suffer to be parked, a vehicle 
in any parking meter space, except as provided by Sections 88.01.1, 88.03.1 and 88.06.1, without 
immediately making or causing to be made a lawful payment at an applicable parking meter as 
provided in Section 88.07. 
LOS ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 88.13(a) (2018); see also Kootenai Envtl. All. v. Panhandle Yacht 
Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1091 (Idaho 1983). 
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every time a car vacates the spot.162 This is not a measure justified only on the 
basis of ensuring turnover, but one aimed at raising revenue. If instead the 
municipality wanted to ensure turnover, it could install technology that would 
not let the same car park twice in a row on the same spot or street.163  
Similarly, the City of Keene, New Hampshire, sued the Robin Hood Group 
for feeding parking meters.164 The municipality claimed tortious interference 
with contractual relations and civil conspiracy to commit tortious interference 
with contractual relations, but the underlying allegations were that the Robin 
Hooders were harassing the officers.165 The case reached the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court, which upheld the First Amendment right of the Robin Hood 
Group.166  
The community dimension of parking, to the extent that it expresses the 
principles limiting the management of curbside parking in public streets, should 
not represent a further constraint. The application of those principles admits 
nuances and gives municipalities some room to choose their management 
options. However, the social reaction against monetizing parking may offer less 
room. At least in the short-term, municipal officials may be wary of 
implementing changes in response to this political economy.  
III.  ECONOMISTS’ RECIPES FOR PARKING 
The standard economic response to curbside parking allocation is a 
seemingly simple one: increase the price.167 Given its scarcity, the market price 
will be high enough to discourage driving to and parking in downtown areas.  
This thinking is promising in theory, but has hardly ever become a reality 
in curbside parking. Curbside parking is often free or very cheap. Municipalities 
are not and should not be operating parking like a business, maximizing profit, 
because curbside parking takes place on public property. The principles guiding 
the management of public property constrain their options: managing curbside 
parking cannot be a profit-making enterprise, parking fees have to be related to 
the social costs of parking, the municipality has to ensure use by the public, and 
 
 162. Nicole Ybarra, How Vehicle Detection Technology is Revolutionizing Parking, IPS GROUP (Jan. 18, 
2017), https://www.ipsgroupinc.com/7351-2/; Parking Meter and Repair, CITY OF SANTA MONICA PUB. 
WORKS, https://www.smgov.net/Departments/PublicWorks/ContentStreetFleet.aspx?id=33303 (last visited Jan. 
19, 2019). 
 163. For a description of ways to enforce time-limits on parking, including electronic handheld citation 
writer with built in camera, see Richards, supra note 42. For a description of how the parking sensors work, see 
Nicole Ybarra, How Vehicle Detection Technology Is Revolutionizing Parking, IPS GROUP (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.ipsgroupinc.com/7351-2/. 
 164. City of Keene v. Cleaveland, 118 A.3d 253, 255 (N.H. 2015).  
 165. Id. at 256.  
 166. Id. at 259; Amy Coveno, NH Supreme Court Rules on Parking Meter Robin-Hooders, WMUR NEWS 
9 (June 9, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.wmur.com/article/nh-supreme-court-rules-on-parking-meter-robin-
hooders/5200953. 
 167. Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking and Stopping on the Commons (U. Chi. 
Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 134, 2001) (discussing and critiquing Harold 
Demsetz’s evolution of property rights as set out in Toward a Theory of Property Rights).  
70.2-PEREZ (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2019  12:33 PM 
394 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:367 
the municipality cannot lose control over public property.168 However, while 
current allocation may comply with those principles, it is not satisfying the goals 
that parking management should serve: high turnover, access, and congestion 
and pollution reduction.169 This Subpart analyzes whether and how the 
municipalities could take a leaf from the economist’s book and still respect the 
stated principles of public property management.  
Next, this Article will analyze the three ways economists would propose to 
achieve a higher price: privatization, property rights, and variable pricing. Cases 
where these strategies have been implemented will illustrate the tension between 
the efficiency goal of these strategies and the fairness principles stated. A private 
company has managed Chicago’s parking meters since 2009; apps have allowed 
drivers to auction their parking spots to the highest bidders in Boston and San 
Francisco; and Boston and San Francisco have implemented variable pricing 
programs increasing parking fees when demand for parking is expected to be 
high. Where possible, this Article proposes potential modifications of the 
economist’s tools making compatible efficiency and fairness, and helping 
achieve the goals of parking management. The main claim is that such principles 
are sufficiently well-rooted to stand some winds of change (such as privatization 
of management or bottom up re-definition of property rights) but also have the 
flexibility to allow some other winds of change (such as variable pricing) to bend 
them without breaking. The principles constraining the management of public 
property are not fully compatible with privatization and bottom up redefinition 
of property rights. Variable pricing, in contrast, can be designed to be compatible 
with those principles while at the same time improving the efficient allocation 
of parking spots and reducing traffic congestion.  
A.  PRIVATIZATION OF PARKING METERS AND ITS MANAGEMENT 
It is governmentmostly municipalitiesthat is to blame for the price of 
parking not forcing drivers to internalize the congestion and pollution costs 
imposed to the community at large and slowing down commerce. In other words, 
we are not dealing with a case of market failure, but of governmental failure.170 
Some economists believe that a private provider may do a better job. The 
privatization of public services is often criticized because it does not always 
translate into an increase in efficiency, and because private companies are profit-
making enterprises that may increase prices, making the services unaffordable 
to the low-income population.171 Privatization is also criticized as a management 
 
 168. See supra Subpart II.A.  
 169. See supra Subpart I.A. 
 170. Grossman defines governmental failure as misallocation of entitlements in a way that do not maximize 
social welfare. PETER Z. GROSSMAN, Is Anything Naturally a Monopoly?, in THE END OF A NATURAL 
MONOPOLY: DEREGULATION AND COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 11, 19 (Peter Z. Grossman 
& Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003). 
 171. John B. Goodman & Gary W. Loveman, Does Privatization Serve the Public Interest?, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Nov.–Dec. 1991, at 26. 
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tool because it impairs the decision-making process of future administrations.172 
Privatizing parking is different than just privatizing just a service—in the case 
of parking, the maintenance of parking meters will be outsourced, thus granting 
private control over the public curbside. While outsourcing is permitted, the 
principles underlying the management of public property limit how it can be 
configured.  
The question of whether privatization of parking meters and its 
management runs afoul of the nature of curbside parking as property held in trust 
for the benefit and use of the people has been answered. As mentioned above, 
the City of Chicago, under the leadership of Mayor Richard M. Daley, leased 
the parking meters and its management for seventy-five years173 to Chicago 
Parking Meters LLC, a venture that included Morgan Stanley, Alliance Capital 
Partners, and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, for a price of $1.15 billion.174 
Not only was the price paid by Chicago Parking Meters LLC perceived as a 
steal,175 but the City also agreed not to build off-street parking lots176 and to pay 
for any street closure or reduction of the hours the parking spots could be 
operated.177 The deal was criticized politically, both on procedural and 
substantive grounds  
From a procedural viewpoint, aldermen (Chicago counsel-members) 
claimed that they did not have access to the bid documents.178 Even though a 
deal of these characteristics takes months to close, they only learned about the 
deal days before the vote. The Daley administration claimed to have worked on 
it for a long time but they were not forthcoming with any information. There 
was also no public comment period. The sudden raising of parking fees and the 
fines associated came as a surprise for the public. Outrage ensued.179 In this 
regard, it is worth quoting the Kootenai case discussed above. The court deciding 
the case noted, regarding the procedural requirements, that: 
[P]ublic trust resources may only be alienated or impaired through open and 
visible actions, where the public is in fact informed of the proposed action and 
 
 172. See Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1965, 1968 (2011); 
see also Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 879, 895 (2011). 
 173. Fisher, supra note 9. 
 174. Id.; Ben Joravsky, FAIL, Part One: Chicago’s Parking Meter Lease Deal, CHI. READER (Apr. 9, 2009), 
https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/features-cover-april-9-2009/Content?oid=1098561. 
 175. See Ben Joravsky, FAIL, Part Three: The Insiders, CHI. READER (June 18, 2009), 
https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/the-parking-meter-fiasco-part-iii/Content?oid=1127436. 
 176. Pablo Ros, Chicago Parking Meters: An Outsourcing Fiasco, AFSCME, 
https://www.afscme.org/news/publications/newsletters/works/works-fall-2013/chicago-parking-meters-an-
outsourcing-fiasco (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 177. See Joravsky, supra note 175.  
 178. Molly Ball, The Privatization Backlash, ATLANTIC (Apr. 23, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/city-state-governments-privatization-contracting-
backlash/361016/. 
 179. See Fisher, supra note 148.  
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has substantial opportunity to respond to the proposed action before a final 
decision is made thereon.180 
In addition, the City itself, governed by Mayor Rahm Emanuel since 2011, 
has reportedly received bills from Chicago Parking Meters amounting to $40 
million for spaces taken out of service for street repairs, street festivals, as well 
as for abuse of issuing handicap permits.181 All things considered, from a 
substantive perspective, it is difficult to affirm that the City retained enough 
control over the company, and thus, the parking meters and the street. This runs 
counter to the principles governing public property.182 
Lastly, the public trust doctrine can offer some transferable way out to the 
City. In the Audubon decision, the court held that government “is not confined 
by past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current 
knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.”183 Outsourcing the management 
of parking meters does not need to amount to an abdication of control. The City 
of Chicago could have negotiated a deal where it retained enough control over 
fees and the use of the street. Further, the City could have put forward some 
program to ensure that those priced-out could still park, or enjoy better public 
transportation.184  
B.  TRADABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The second recipe to solve the parking scarcity problem is property rights. 
Cheap curbside parking becomes an open commons. In his famous article 
Tragedy of the Commons, Hardin proposes property rights as a solution to the 
overexploitation of the commons.185 Assigning property rights over a resource 
makes the owner internalize the costs and benefits, and manage the property to 
ensure its long-term viability. The current definition of the right to use a parking 
spot and occupy it for a certain amount of time falls short of what an economist 
will prescribe because it is not tradable, and thus may not end up in the hands of 
who most values it. People adopt a territorial stance over a parking spot and, 
 
 180. Kootenai Envtl. All. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1091 (Idaho 1983) (emphasis 
omitted).  
 181. Editorial, Chicago Parking Meter Deals Needs Changes, CHI. TRIB. (June 2, 2013), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-06-02/opinion/ct-edit-meters-20130602_1_chicago-parking-meters-
llc-chicago-city-council-aldermen. 
 182. It is worth noting that a conveyance to Loyola University of certain river bank properties in Chicago 
was struck down for similar reasons. Lake Mich. Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 742 F. Supp. 441, 445 
(N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 183. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983). 
 184. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION & HISTORIC PRES., supra note 127. For an account of 
how transportation affects low-income populations in a positive manner, see generally Raj Chetty & Nathaniel 
Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational Mobility I: Childhood Exposure Effects, 133 Q. 
J. ECON. 1107 (2018); Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on Intergenerational 
Mobility II: County-Level Estimates, 133 Q. J. ECON. 1163 (2018). 
 185. Hardin, supra note 39, at 1245; see also Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. 
ECON. REV. 347, 351–54 (1967); James E. Krier, Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 139, 140 (2009). 
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having searched and waited for it, may consider it a fruit of their labor to which 
they are entitled,186 when they only have a temporary, non-tradable license to 
use it. Making parking spots tradable would ensure that parking is allocated to 
the highest-value user.  
Property rights are not static. When a good becomes scarce (demand 
outstrips supply), it becomes valuable, and property rights are likely to evolve, 
either by being created in the first place (as in Demsetz’s example of the beaver’s 
fur for the Native American hunters of the Labrador Peninsula),187 or by being 
redefined. Additionally, technological changes can render delineation and 
enforcement of property rights feasible or inexpensive where it was not 
previously so,188 as barbed wire showed in the American West.189 Furthermore, 
technology can reduce transaction costs, making transfers over certain 
previously underutilized assets much easier.190 For example, private garages and 
driveways in Toronto can be temporarily shared by their owners for parking 
purposes thanks to apps designed for this purpose.191  
Several of these factors prompting a redefinition of property rights and a 
reduction of transaction costs in curbside parking coalesced in the 2010s. 
Parking scarcity was acutely felt in cities like San Francisco and Boston. Apps 
were all the rage, and tech entrepreneurs realized that there was a niche in 
parking. These entrepreneurs developed apps where a driver could sell their 
parking spot or, more accurately, the right to temporarily occupy a parking spot 
on the curbside. The buyer acquired it on the online platform, and then drove to 
the spot, where the seller was waiting to vacate it. It is axiomatic for a secondary 
market to emerge when a good is priced below what the market price would 
be.192 But redefining property rights over segments of public streets is more 
contentious and legally complex than over private driveways.193 In curbside 
 
 186. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 18–19 (Richard Cox ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 
1982) (1689).  
 187. Demsetz, supra note 164, at 352–53; Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the 
Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 333 (2002).  
 188. Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morriss, The Technologies of Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative 
Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 167–68 (2001); see also, e.g., Terry L. Anderson 
& P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 164–165 
(1975).  
 189. Anderson & Hill, supra note 188, at 175.  
 190. The ideals of the sharing economy include increasing offers by making available to the community 
unused private resources or broadening the group of people with access to the resources in question. This is not 
applicable to curbside parking. Parking is scarce and the apps price out a segment of the population and not 
everyone has the technology to access the sharing economy apps. Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 501, 536–37 (2016).  
 191. Vanessa Lu, Parking Apps Will Allow Owners to Rent Out Parking Spots by the Hour, TORONTO STAR 
(May 21, 2015), https://www.thestar.com/business/2015/05/21/parking-apps-will-allow-owners-to-rent-out-
parking-spots-by-the-hour.html. 
 192. See Gavett et al., supra note 44. 
 193. In a news release, the City of San Francisco made clear that people are free “to rent out their own 
private driveways,” just not the public streets. Elizabeth Weise, SF City Attorney: No Renting out Public Parking 
Spaces, USA TODAY (June 23, 2014, 12:41 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/06/23/san-
francisco-rent-public-parking-space-monkey-parking-sweetch-parkmondo/11263723/. 
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parking, the seller had to wait for the buyer to arrive because he could not 
exclude third parties from occupying the spot if he vacated it.194 The driver had 
a right to use the spot, but it was not tradable and it did not include the right to 
exclude others. That is, the holder of the right to use a parking spot cannot 
enforce those transactions against third parties.195 But, at the least, the apps 
modified the first-in-time principle that normally operates in curbside parking. 
Where the apps operated, the person entitled to a parking spot was not whoever 
arrived first to the vacant spot, but who agreed to pay a price online. While a 
complete redefinition of parking property rights did not occur, the experience 
illustrates some of the problems that such a strategy would entail. As shall be 
seen, it would be incompatible with the principles listed in Subpart II.A.7.  
Those apps were short-lived, however, as municipalities banned them.196 
The municipalities did not buy the argument put forward by the app companies 
that they were only selling information,197 and thus were protected by free 
speech.198 The ban can be read as a way for the municipalities to shut down 
competitors: those who are making money where the municipalities cannot. 
However, beyond that public choice reading, the principles underlying the 
management of public property also explain the ban. Those principles were 
reflected in the regulations that the municipalities based their decisions on. The 
apps allowed private parties to profit from property owned by the public, pricing 
out a segment of the population, and reducing control by the municipality. Not 
only were city councils against the apps; the public was too. While we may 
accept, albeit reluctantly, when searching for a spot that people reserve a parking 
spot for a friend or a relative, the reservation via the app was not well-received. 
The apps were labeled #jerktech.199 Reservation of a spot in public-owned 
property, by means of a price, was perceived as free-riding from the public. The 
ordinances and responses of each municipality will be analyzed next.  
 
 194. See Ann-Marie Alcantara, Parking App Asks: What’s Wrong with Paying for Someone Else’s Spot?, 
MASHABLE (May 17, 2014), https://mashable.com/2014/05/17/monkeyparking-san-francisco/#9Fdu2Ms9OgqI. 
 195. Kochan argues that the sharing economy is based on the premise that whatever one shares is something 
that it is hers. Ownership is a prerequisite to being able to use or share a stick in the bundle of rights associated 
with that ownership. Donald J. Kochan, I Share, Therefore It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 909, 910 (2017). 
Granted, people adopt a territorial stance over a parking spot and, having searched and waited for it, they may 
consider it a fruit of their labor to which they are entitled. LOCKE, supra note 186, at 18–19. But in the parking 
realm the right to share a parking spot is not property in the way Kochan suggests—private parties are making 
profits out of a right they do not own. In addition, while the sharing economy is seen as sharing underutilized 
resources, Zale, supra note 190, at 527–33, and as an alternative to the capitalist economy, see generally Rashmi 
Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative Capitalist System, 90 TULANE L. REV. 
241 (2015), in the case of the parking apps, both statements fail.  
 196. Streitfeld, supra note 8. 
 197. Adam Vaccaro, Sorry, You Can’t Sell Me on Pay for-Public-Parking Apps, BOSTON.COM (July 12, 
2014), https://www.boston.com/news/technology/2014/07/12/sorry-you-cant-sell-me-on-pay-for-public-
parking-apps. 
 198. See Jerold Chinn, MonkeyParking Defies City’s Cease-and-Desist, SF BAY (June 27, 2014), 
https://sfbay.ca/2014/06/27/monkeyparking-defies-citys-cease-and-desist/ (arguing the cease-and-desist 
violated free speech). 
 199. Constine, supra note 149; Harford, supra note 149. 
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1. Boston: Haystack 
Finding parking in downtown Boston is a daunting task and certainly one 
to which the idiom “looking for a needle in a haystack” can be applied. Haystack, 
an aptly named app, promised to ease the parking travails of Bostonians. The 
app matched users occupying parking spotsmetered or notwith users 
looking for a parking spot and allowed the former to “sell” “their” spot to the 
latter. The average price was $3, but prices could be higher as long as they did 
not go over the established cap of $15. Haystack only operated for some months 
during the year 2014, and the Baltimore-based start-up behind it is no longer in 
business. Haystack experienced death-by-regulation. The City of Boston 
Ordinance 1310—“an ordinance prohibiting the selling, leasing, or reserving of 
public ways in the City of Boston”—that passed in August 2014200 was the 
weapon. The Ordinance aimed at ensuring “that all residents and visitors have 
equal and fair access to use of the public ways,” and amended the City of Boston 
Code by adding a new section prohibiting the selling, leasing, reserving, or 
facilitation of reserving of any street, way, highway, road or parkway, or portion 
thereof, under the City of Boston’s control.201  
The Ordinance was aimed at banning the operation of Haystack, and it 
succeeded. Haystack’s CEO (Eric Meyer) participated in an August 13, 2014, 
public hearing on the ordinance.202 Mr. Meyer asked the City Council to allow 
the app to operate for a longer period of time before reaching a final judgment, 
and to let the market settle whether the app was harming the City.203 Mr. Meyer 
also highlighted the benefits to congestion and the environment.204 Mr. Meyer 
argued that the Ordinance would have a chilling effect on innovation. A 
councilman responded that “while progress happens because of change not all 
changes are progress.”205 
In the hearings, councilors expressed their worries about a slippery slope 
leading to for-profit business enterprises targeting public benches or public 
tennis courts in parks.206 Councilors feared that the price would go up, affecting 
equal access.207 The councilors defended other sharing-economy business 
 
 200. BOS., MASS., MUN. CODE ch. 16, § 16-12.43 (2017); see also Steve Annear, Haystack Parking App 
Could Be Stalled by Proposed City Ordinance, BOS. MAG. (Aug. 11, 2014, 1:36 PM), 
http://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/blog/2014/08/11/haystack-app-city-council-hearing/; Garrett Quinn, 
Boston City Council Bans Parking Apps like Haystack, MASSLIVE (Aug. 20, 2014), 
http://www.masslive.com/news/boston/index.ssf/2014/08/boston_city_council_passes_ban.html.  
 201. MUN. § 16-12.43; see also Annear, supra note 200; Quinn, supra note 200. 
 202. David L. Harris, Boston City Council Votes to Ban Haystack Parking App, BALT. BUS. J. (Aug. 20, 
2014, 2:23 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/news/2014/08/20/boston-city-council-votes-to-ban-
haystack-parking.html. 
 203. Haystack, Haystack CEO Defends Parking Innovation, YOUTUBE (Aug. 13, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RBLTtlFATEk (showing Haystack Chief Executive Eric Meyer speaking 
at a Boston City Council hearing on a proposed ordinance designed to prohibit Haystack’s service in the city). 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id.  
 206. Id.  
 207. Id.  
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models, such as Uber or Zipcar, and distinguished them from Haystack by 
pointing out that Uber and Zipcar deal with privately-owned assets, not public 
property.208 The councilors further claimed that current parking revenues 
benefited the population as a whole, and that in many cases, the City does not 
even charge residents for parking.209 Other concerns expressed during the 
hearings included the risk of distracted driving; and the risk of “street rows” 
(quarrels between users and non-users of Haystack).210 Mr. Meyer argued that 
the terms of use of the app required the user to follow local regulations, for 
instance, forcing a driver to forfeit the sale and let a non-user park if required.211 
The purpose for surrendering the parking spot was not controlled, and could 
incentivize individuals to hoard spots for sale when demand is higher, solely for 
making money.212 Mr. Meyer claimed that the app could have technology built 
in to avoid hoarding of parking spaces.213 Thus, it could limit the number of 
spots a person could trade and could track the location via GPS.214 But, 
Mr. Meyer was not successful in convincing the local councilmen. The day after 
the hearing, Haystack was banned. 
2. San Francisco: MonkeyParking, ParkModo, and Sweetch 
In the summer of 2014, the San Francisco City Attorney sent cease-and-
desist letters to the companies running the following two curbside-parking apps: 
MonkeyParking215 and ParkModo.216 Those letters had a chilling effect on 
Sweetch, a third company.217 MonkeyParking, an app launched in Rome, Italy, 
and San Francisco, encouraged drivers in its Twitter account to “make #money 
when you leave a #parking spot.”218 Users could either offer a parking spot they 
were about to vacate or bid for it. The app would facilitate the ensuing 
 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. Id.  
 212. Id.  
 213. Id.  
 214. Id.  
 215. Cease-and-Desist Letter from Dennis J. Herrera, S.F. City Attorney, to Paolo Dobrowolny, CEO, 
Monkey Parking (June 23, 2014), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/S.F.-City-
Attorney-letter-to-Monkey-Parking.pdf; Lydia O’Connor, This App Sums Up Why Everyone Hates Silicon 
Valley, HUFFINGTON POST (May 7, 2014, 9:34 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/07/monkey-
parking-app-san-francisco_n_5276536.html. 
 216. Cease-and-Desist Letter from Dennis J. Herrera, S.F. City Attorney, to Dan Shifrin, Founder, 
ParkModo (June 25, 2014), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/S.F.-City-Attorney-
letter-to-ParkModo.pdf; see also Josh Constine, SF Sends Cease-and-Desist to Apps Selling Public Parking 
Spots, TECHCRUNCH (June 23, 2014), https://techcrunch.com/2014/06/23/parking-apps/. 
 217. See Joey Cosco, Banned San Francisco Parking App Goes Open Source to Find a Solution to SF’s 
Parking Problem, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 4, 2014, 3:18 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/sweetch-freetch-
banned-san-francisco-parking-app-open-source-2014-8.  
 218. Monkey Parking (@MonkeyParking), TWITTER (Mar. 19, 2014, 10:47 AM), 
https://twitter.com/MonkeyParking/status/446342248121131008/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%
5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E446342248121131008&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fblog.sfgate.com%2Ftechch
ron%2F2014%2F05%2F05%2Fsell-your-s-f-street-parking-spot-for-20%2F. 
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transaction, which would be considered completed once the successful bidder 
was actually allowed to park. Upon completion, the price was transferred to the 
“seller’s” bank account, except for a 20% commission kept by MonkeyParking.  
ParkModo did not even launch. It was targeted by the City Attorney after 
a job listing was posted on Craigslist. According to the post, candidates willing 
to occupy prime parking spots from 5:30 PM to 9:00 PM in order to sell those 
spots through the app would be paid $13 per hour.219 Sweetch’s initial business 
model220 was similar to that of MonkeyParking with some caveats. The “buyer” 
would pay a $5 flat-fee to park and the “seller” (or the person who would “help 
a Sweetch buddy park”) would get a $4 credit to use in the app or to donate it to 
charity (the extra $1 would cover the costs of running the app).221 The main 
difference between Sweetch and the other two apps is the absence of cash 
transfers between the users.  
The City Attorney considered the app’s business model to be premised on 
unlawful transactions and an unfair business practice violating the California 
Unfair Competition Law.222 Other allegations were also made in the letter, such 
as that the app was increasing the possibility of distracted driving, since it may 
promote the use of cell-phones while driving.223 But more importantly, for the 
purposes of this Article, the privatization of the curbside violated the city’s 
Police Code. In San Francisco, there was no need to pass a new ordinance.224 
According to the City Attorney,225 not only the start-ups operating the apps, but 
also the app users themselves, were violating San Francisco Police Code, section 
63(b), which states:  
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to enter into a lease, rental 
agreement or contract of any kind, written or oral, with or without compensation, 
for the use of any street or sidewalk.226  
 
 219. Patrick Hoge, App for Selling Public Parking Spots Exits San Francisco, S.F. BUS. TIMES (July 1, 2014, 
8:00 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/techflash/2014/06/app-for-selling-public-parking-
spots-exits-san.html. 
 220. The original business model was later amended as a result of communications with the City Attorney’s 
Office. Sweetch eliminated the $5 flat-fee. Leslie Nguyen-Okwu, Sweetch Parking App Adapts to City’s 
Demands, MISSION LOC. (July 21, 2014, 5:01 PM), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20150518084401/https://missionlocal.org/2014/07/sweetch-parking-app-adapts-to-
citys-demands/. In other words, the sellers and the company running the app forwent the $4 and $1 payments, 
respectively. However, the app was put on hold after operating for a while under the amended business model. 
Press Release, City Attorney of S.F., All Three Illegal Parking Apps on Hiatus in S.F. as Herrera’s Cease-and-
Desist Deadline Passes (July 11, 2014), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2014/07/11/all-three-illegal-parking-
apps-on-hiatus-in-s-f-as-herreras-cease-and-desist-deadline-passes/. 
 221. Selena Larson, A New Parking App Wants You to Share Something You Don’t Own, READWRITE (June 
21, 2014), https://readwrite.com/2014/06/21/sweetch-parking-mission-san-francisco/. 
 222. Id.  
 223. Cease-and-Desist Letter from Dennis J. Herrera, supra note 216. 
 224. See S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 1, § 63 (2018).  
 225. Press Release, City Attorney of S.F., San Francisco Tells Monkey Parking to Drop Mobile App for 
Auctioning City Parking Spots (June 23, 2014), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/07/Monkey-Parking-Cease-and-Desist-Demand-Presskit.pdf.  
 226. POLICE § 63(b). 
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MonkeyParking tried to pursue its business model in other 
municipalities.227 Probably aiming to make the app more appealing to 
municipalities, the start-up even envisioned mechanisms to share revenue with 
municipalities.228 By doing so, the start-up seemed to be paying little attention 
(again) to the applicable laws of curbside parking.  
3. Are Tradable Parking Rights Compatible with the Public-Property 
Nature of the Curbside? 
The trading mechanisms designed by the apps are not compatible with the 
public-property nature of the curbside. First, the apps’ prices are not dictated by 
the cost of providing parking or any other social cost related to parking scarcity, 
like congestion or pollution, as required by the principles guiding the 
management of public property require. Instead, the apps’ prices are based on 
the opportunity cost of the sellers and buyers. Second, by increasing the price, 
the apps are making it unaffordable for a segment of the population who before 
may have been able to pay the low fees combined with the cost in terms of time 
spent searching for a spot. The apps’ prices make it difficult for that segment of 
the public to access and use curbside parking without any compensation. Even 
though section 63(b) of the San Francisco Police Code and Boston’s Ordinance 
1310 (“[a]n ordinance prohibiting the selling, leasing or reserving of public ways 
in the City of Boston”) were used to stop the apps, the bans in Boston and San 
Francisco were based on local regulations that reflect the idea that cities need to 
keep control of the streets. The trade of parking spots could comply with those 
principles if the cities were to fix the prices and equity concerns that would be 
built into the apps by, for example, giving vouchers to low-income car owners 
and preventing hoarding of spaces. 
C.  VARIABLE PRICING 
The economist’s solution to scarcity is to reduce demand by increasing 
price. A slightly more refined version of this solution is variable pricing,229 also 
known as dynamic or performance pricing.230 Dynamic pricing balances supply 
and demand by charging a higher price when demand peaks.231 William Vickrey, 
a Nobel Prize winner, recommended the use of variable pricing for parking. 
 
 227. Gene Maddaus, Kicked Out of San Francisco, MonkeyParking App Plans a Fresh Start in Santa 
Monica, L.A. WKLY. (Sept. 18, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/kicked-out-of-san-francisco-
monkeyparking-app-plans-a-fresh-start-in-santa-monica-5080436. 
 228. Id.  
 229. Shoup advocates for this contentious but much more sensible policy for improving the situation 
curbside parking. Donald Shoup, The Right Price for Curb Parking, CATO UNBOUND (Apr. 25, 2011), 
https://www.cato-unbound.org/print-issue/369.  
 230. Donald Shoup, The Price of Parking on a Great Street, PARKING TODAY, Feb. 2009, at 22. 
 231. James F. Peltz, Why ‘Dynamic’ Pricing Based on Real-Time Supply and Demand Is Rapidly Spreading, 
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2016, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-agenda-dynamic-pricing-
20160314-story.html. It is different from price discrimination. Price discrimination bases price variation on the 
willingness to pay of the individual consumer or type of consumer.  
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However, when Vickrey made the recommendation in the 1950s, the technology 
to implement variable pricing was lacking. In 1993, Vickrey himself labeled it 
as one of his “innovative failures in economics.”232 The passing of time has 
proven him wrong. 
 Variable pricing has been gaining traction as a response to curbside 
parking scarcity and the congestion and pollution costs that curbside parking 
generates. In fact, the variable pricing parking fees are not only embodying the 
ideas of Vickrey, but also of another economist, Arthur C. Pigou. Pigou 
proposed taxes to make those creating externalities realize the full social cost of 
their actions.233 By pricing parking higher at peak congestion times, the 
municipality is going beyond traditional user fees and making drivers realize the 
congestion costs they impose on others.234 Variable pricing may achieve similar 
results to other successful initiatives to achieve the goals of reduced congestion 
and pollution. Among such initiatives, for example, Paris, France only permits 
cars with odd-numbered plates to travel downtown streets on certain days; cars 
with even-numbered plates are allowed to do so on the remaining days.235 Also, 
London charged drivers to access traditionally congested areas.236 Those 
initiatives would also reduce the need for parking, showing the endogeneity of 
the parking problem.  
Variable parking balances supply and demand by charging a higher price 
when demand peaks. In its curbside parking version, the price of curbside 
parking surges when (and where) curbside parking becomes highly sought-after. 
As the price of curbside parking becomes higher, the number of drivers willing 
to pay the price plummets, and the number of people using public transport and 
carpools, or simply walking, increases. A precursor to variable pricing for 
curbside parking has existed for a long time in many downtowns. Many pay-to-
park zones are only so during business hours, but not at night or Sundays when 
demand is lower. However, to achieve any significant improvement in 
congestion and pollution terms, a more refined scheme is needed. Current 
technology allows for more tailored systems.237 Among the few municipalities 
 
 232. Todd Litman, How to Do Efficient Congestion Pricing (or Thoughts on William Vickrey), MKT. 
URBANISM REP. (Aug. 24, 2018), https://marketurbanismreport.com/efficient-congestion-pricing-thoughts-
william-vickrey/. 
 233. N. GREGORY MANKIW, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 203 (Jack W. Calhoun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012). 
See generally ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (4th ed. 1920) (proposing taxes to make those 
creating externalities realize the full social cost of their actions). 
 234. Tax scholars argue that Pigouvian fees do not have a great fit in the current tax and fee dichotomy. 
Scharff proposes, to end the confusion, to call these Pigouvian style measures “fiscal regulatory tools” and 
subject them to two requirements: set the price approximately at the level of the externality and that the revenue 
will be reinvested in abating the externality. Scharff, supra note 93, at 41. 
 235. Katie Forster, Paris Bans Cars with Even Plates in Third Day of Transport Restrictions to Ease Air 
Pollution, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/paris-banned-cars-
even-number-plates-pollution-latest-public-transport-air-smog-bans-a7462621.html. 
 236. Jonathan Leape, The London Congestion Charge, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 157, 159–60 (2006). 
 237. SHOUP, supra note 20, at xxiv–xxvi.  
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to adopt such a system, San Francisco stands out.238 SF Park establishes prices 
which vary per location and per time of the day, and which are only adjusted 
once a month.  
Under variable pricing, the municipality does not set the prices to 
maximize revenue, but to maximize social benefit. Prices are fine-tuned to 
ensure the best combination of congestion, pollution reduction, and availability 
of spots. SF Park aims at achieving 15% vacancy of parking spots.239 In contrast, 
in the apps auctioning off parking spots, whether a driver is willing to sell his 
parking spot at a certain price to a driver who is ten minutes away depends on 
their opportunity cost, that is, what else could they be doing with that time.240 
With the apps, the reduction in congestion is an externality, a positive one, but 
not something considered when asking a price for the driver’s spot. To comply 
with the principles of public property management, a policy should set the price 
at the cost of the externality to achieve an efficient result, and parking apps do 
not set that price. 
In contrast, San Francisco abides by the principles that should guide public 
management of public property by setting the price while considering the public 
benefits and while having a regulatory purpose other than revenue-making in 
mind. However, the access component embedded in those principles requires 
some careful consideration next.  
SF Park establishes rates that vary per block, time of day, and day of the 
week. The minimum is $0.50 per hour and the maximum is capped at $7 per 
hour. Rates can be adjusted upwards up to $0.25 and downwards up to $0.50 
once a month.241 SF Park always charges the maximum amount near the San 
Francisco Giants ballpark (AT&T Park) when there are games scheduled. This 
could have a disproportionate effect on low-income fans. It is paradoxical that 
regulation of ticket scalping has been justified on, among others, access and 
fairness arguments,242 but fairness has been largely ignored when it comes to 
curbside parking near the Giants’ stadium. Such curbside parking is instrumental 
for leisure activities, such as going to a baseball game. But even more important 
is that it is instrumental for the daily commute of many low-income individuals 
working in downtown243 and living far away.244 Echo Rowe’s story—who had 
 
 238. Gregory Pierce & Donald Shoup, Getting the Prices Right, 79 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 67, 78 (2013). 
 239. Dani Simons, SFpark: San Francisco Knows How to Park It, 23 SUSTAINABLE TRANSPORT 26, 26 
(2012). 
 240. See DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 2–3 (2005).  
 241. How it Works: Pricing, SFPARK, http://sfpark.org/how-it-works/pricing/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). 
 242. Steven C. Highfield, How Modern Trends and Market Economics Have Rendered Anti-Ticket Scalping 
Legislation Obsolete, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 697, 703 (2010) (listing other arguments such as fairness to the first 
seller who may not get the profit that resellers make or avoiding the nuisance created by the reseller near the 
stadium); Gregory M. Stein, Will Ticket Scalpers Meet the Same Fate as Spinal Tap Drummers? The Sale and 
Resale of Concert and Sports Tickets, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 21 (2014).  
 243. See Dalmas, supra note 4. 
 244. Mapping Displacement and Gentrification in the San Francisco Bay Area, URB. DISPLACEMENT, 
http://www.urbandisplacement.org/map/sf (last visited Jan. 19, 2019). For an illustration of how housing prices 
have displaced workers to the suburbs, see Dougherty & Burton, supra note 28. 
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her truck removed and sold as a result of an accumulation of parking fines that 
she was not able to pay—illustrates how dependent some people are on curbside 
parking. One way to mitigate the access concern, and ensure that the public use 
of the streets is not affected, is to re-invest the parking revenue in public 
transportation. The re-investment could make variable pricing more popular.245 
New York parks offer a good model in making variable pricing compatible 
with access. If parkland is converted into a different use, the municipality has to 
provide equal parkland elsewhere, according to the Land and Water 
Conservation Fund Act.246 To pass the equivalency test, the land has to meet 
three requirements: (1) it has to be of equal or greater fair market value; (2) it 
has to provide equivalent recreational usefulness; and (3) it has to be in a 
comparable location.247 Neither the size nor the usefulness have to be exactly 
identical.248 In the same way that parkland here or there are not perfect 
substitutes for each other, curbside parking is even less so. Creating free parking 
spaces in faraway areas of the city is of little help. But strategies like Park and 
Ride may work to everyone’s interest where parking areas are built next to 
public transportation stops.249 Investing the revenues from variable pricing in 
public transportation, and offering parking in areas that connect via public 
transport with downtown or with neighborhoods where parking is expensive, 
can make variable pricing compatible with the principles guiding the 
management of public streets—and, thus, parking—in trust. In fact, early 
parking decisions allowed municipalities to invest fees from parking on the 
streets in municipally-run off-street parking and pool the resources from both to 
manage a unified parking system.250 In 1947, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court, assessing the constitutionality of parking meters, stated that using parking 
meter fees for off-street parking was acceptable because, by removing cars from 
the road, it was a way of investing in the public highways.251  
SF Park has been using its revenue to implement some of these solutions, 
so as to make variable pricing compatible with access and fairness. San 
Francisco is reinvesting revenue to help cover the deficit of the Muni system, 
 
 245. Donald Shoup, an influential and pro-variable pricing parking scholar, advised that the revenue from 
the increased fees be earmarked for local districts in order to make variable pricing more popular. This is not 
exactly the same idea that is proposed by this Article. Shoup advocates the re-investment in the neighborhood, 
not only in public transportation. This, according to him, may, for example, mitigate the concerns that some 
business owners may have. See Shoup, supra note 230. Unpopularity is expected to subside. High prices may 
be unpopular, but what initially is perceived as unfair may evolve to become the new normal according to 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler. See Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements 
in the Market, supra note 150.  
 246. 54 U.S.C. § 200305(f)(3) (2012); see also Save Our Parks v. Kempthorne, No. 06 Civ. 6859 NRB, 
2006 WL 3378703 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2006). 
  247. N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF PARKS, RECREATION & HISTORIC PRES., supra note 127, at 23–24.  
 248. Id. at 24.  
 249. Stuart Meek, Park and Ride, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF TRANSPORT DEMAND 
MANAGEMENT MEASURES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 165 (Stephen Ison & Tom Rye eds., 2008).  
 250. See Parr v. Ladd, 36 N.W.2d 157 (Mich. 1949); Cleveland v. City of Detroit, 37 N.W.2d 625, 630 
(Mich. 1949); In re Op. of the Justices, 51 A.2d 836, 839 (N.H. 1947).  
 251. In re Op. of the Justices, 51 A.2d at 839.  
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San Francisco’s public transportation system.252 By reinvesting the revenue in 
public transportation, SF Park ensures access to downtown, even if it is not the 
same type of access. Other cities, like Boston, are trying pilot projects of variable 
pricing in some of the most congested areas of the city, Back Bay and the Seaport 
District. Boston looked up to San Francisco, but Mayor Martin Walsh said, 
referring to pricing, that Boston’s version would be “reasonable.”253 However, 
even though the prices are a bit lower (the maximum hourly fee being capped at 
$5 per hour), the current design does not seem to ensure access, an issue the 
councilmen were very concerned about during the hearings regarding 
Haystack’s operation.254 Instead of reinvesting in public transportation, Boston’s 
parking revenue is going to street maintenance.255 Street maintenance is in the 
public interest but would hardly benefit those who are excluded from parking in 
those very same streets. Public transportation in the Boston area is under the 
power of the county. Hence, Boston should collaborate with other public entities 
to reinvest the revenue in public transportation.  
The public interest is better served with higher prices for parking that take 
into account the congestion cost but also ensure that the community’s access to 
public property is not impaired. Variable pricing, with re-investment of the 
revenue that exceeds the costs of parking enforcement into the public 
transportation system, is an efficient solution that is also fair. 
CONCLUSION 
Curbside parking is instrumental to activities—voting, shopping, 
protesting, or going to the doctor—in many municipalities. As long as cars, self-
driving or not, need to be parked somewhere, parking policies will have a great 
impact on how livable cities are.256 Municipalities’ parking policies have to 
serve many goals. Parking scarcity is a challenge for many towns. It makes 
dreaded congestion and pollution even worse. Current allocation based on the 
first-in-time rule and low fees is not solving the problem. A standard economist 
will advise those municipalities to reduce demand and allocate parking to the 
highest-value users by increasing the price. But, the policy choices of 
municipalities searching for an efficient way to allocate parking are constrained. 
They are constrained not only by social attitudes, but by principles limiting the 
 
 252. S.F. MUN. TRANSP. AGENCY, DELIVERING PROGRESS: FY 2015–2016 ANNUAL REPORT 29 (2016), 
https://www.sfmta.com/sites/default/files/reports/2016/Delivering%20Progress%20SFMTA%20FY%202016
%20Annual%20Report_0.pdf; Zachary Crockett, San Francisco Parking Meters: A $130MM Industry, 
PRICEONOMICS (Jan. 10, 2014), https://priceonomics.com/san-francisco-parking-meters-a-s130mm-industry/. 
 253. Shaffer, supra note 11. 
 254. Haystack, Haystack CEO Defends Parking Innovation, supra note 203.  
 255. Shaffer, supra note 11. 
 256. While self-driving electric cars may well ease problems caused by the pollution coming from emission 
of combustion engines in the future, congestion may still be a problem. Why Driverless Cars May Mean Jams 
Tomorrow, ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2018), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21735019-
they-will-spare-world-neither-traffic-congestion-nor-infrastructure-expense-why. 
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management of public property, including curbside parking that takes place on 
public property.  
Efficiency-oriented policies translating into higher parking prices 
(privatization, tradable property rights, and variable pricing) must include 
mechanisms to ensure that the goal is not profit-making and that fair access is 
guaranteed to the public. This Article distills the principles that the management 
of public property must respect and shows where efficiency and fairness can be 
compatible and where they cannot. For example, sharing-economy 
entrepreneurs’ attempts to disrupt the current economic model of curbside 
parking by making parking spots tradable on apps is not compatible. But variable 
pricing—where the municipality sets higher prices when demand is expected to 
be higher—can be compatible if the revenue is re-invested in public 
transportation. Public transportation ensures that those priced out no longer need 
their cars to do the activities where parking was previously instrumental. 
As parking has shown, public property cannot be managed like private 
property. But there are other examples. Technology giants have faced public 
relations crises for ignoring the street view of property, as the criticism received 
by private company buses in Silicon Valley shows. Private company buses 
created quite the stir in San Francisco when using public bus stops.257 Another 
example of managing public property as if it were private is found in some 
beaches. Non-local surfers may be wary of going to certain locations where local 
surfers have appropriated the beaches. Attempting to surf in those locations 
means risking your car tires or even being the recipient of physical violence.258 
Perhaps in the future, private companies will try to buy local beaches as the 
Maldivians are experiencing,259 and the principles limiting monetization of 
public property that this Article has analyzed will be helpful to deal with such a 
situation. 
Public property and property rights over public property are fascinating 
topics of study. Curbside parking demonstrates that public property is something 
more than simply private property where the right holder happens to be a 
governmental entity. From a descriptive perspective, public property, and the 
limited private rights over it, deserve more attention by property law scholars 
even if doing so requires venturing into unfamiliar fields of the law, perusing 
municipal codes, or analyzing cases outside the property law and constitutional 
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canons. From a normative perspective, this topic requires finding a manner in 
which to make the limits of management and use of public property compatible 
with the economic-efficiency toolbox. This Article has attempted to provide the 
foundation to support the much needed descriptive and normative scholarship 
on public property and the property rights over public property.  
